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LAND LAW SUBSYSTEMS? URBAN VIETNAM
AS A CASE STUDY
John Gillespiet
Abstract:
Throughout Vietnam's long history, the central elite and peripheral
farming communities have been legally and culturally divided. This dichotomy was
never as complete as the famous injunction that "the emperor's writ stops at the village
gate" infers. Initially, during the period of French colonisation and more recently since
the introduction of doi moi (renovation) economic reforms, central authorities have
attempted to unify land management with universal normative law. This experiment
has stimulated widespread non-compliance with land laws in urban centres; in some
areas compliance is a fringe phenomenon. In this divided legal geography, pockets of
non-compliance give the appearance of autonomy from state legality-suggesting the
existence of plural land law sub-systems. But an analysis of case studies concerning
land use right applications, squatting, court decisions and compulsory acquisition
reveals complex relationships between land occupiers and the state. A myriad of formal
and relational connections blurs the interface between state and society, suggesting that
the official and unofficial aspects of land management are best understood as two
components of the same system. Urban case studies suggest officials and the public
share a common culture that sustains relational networks binding state land
management and local land practices. In this relational matrix, the legal pluralistic
concept of 'non-state legal sub-systems' is difficult to substantiate. Where relational
networks are weak, such as between hill tribes and the central state, non-state legal
subsytems continue to flourish.

I.

INTRODUCTION

After 1954, Vietnamese socialist planners neglected and depopulated
northern cities, which were tainted by their colonial heritage.1 During this
period, land managers redistributed housing in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam ("DRV") to party cadre and state employees without addressing the

needs of other urban residents.2 Uncertain land laws and policies induced a
precipitous decline in house construction and maintenance.3 It was not until
1 Senior lecturer, Law School, Deakin University, Melbourne Australia; Barrister and Solicitor
Victoria; LLM, BSc., Monash. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by numerous
Vietnamese officials, academics and lawyers, the careful reading of an earlier draft by Professor Ben
Kerkvliet and the financial support of the Australian Research Council.
'
See NIGEL THRIFT & DEAN FORBES, THE PRICE OF WAR,122-34 (1986) (stating Northern cities
recorded slow growth, while southern cities lost population).
2
Interview with Trinh Duy Luan, Director of the Department of Urban Sociology,
Institute of
Sociology, in Hanoi (Nov. 8 1997).
' For example, in 1989, 42% of residents in Ho Chi Minh City lived in housing built between 19611971, while in Hanoi the rate was 23% and in Ha Phong 19%. See Trinh Duy Luon and Nguyen Quong Vinh,
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reunification of the country in 1975 that a state funded National Housing
Program, applying socialist, egalitarian distribution principles, began to
improve urban housing conditions. By the 1980s a combination of corrupt
allocation practices 4 and substantial budget shortfalls excited a radical change
in housing policy. After the introduction of doi-moi (renovation) economic
reforms, 5 those with capital were encouraged to satisfy their own housing
needs.6 This policy has been spectacularly successful; of all housing built
since the reunification in Ho Chi Minh City, eighty-six percent was added
between 1986 and 1993. 7
The reforms have produced a vibrant residential land market, a
construction boom and an ascendant middle class. Nonetheless, they have
also exacerbated squatting and increased the incidence of non-compliance
with land allotment, transfer and compulsory acquisition procedures.8 "Hot
spots" have also erupted throughout rural Vietnam, which directly, and
occasionally violently challenge land management policies. 9 But more
generally, widespread official toleration of technically unlawful land practices
infers a convergence between community and low ranking bureaucratic
perceptions of land use. Conversely, wide spread non-compliance with land
laws suggests a dichotomy between central laws and policies and local
perceptions and aspirations.
Center-local bifurcation is not unique to Vietnam. By generalizing and
unifying land practices, central laws everywhere have the potential to
undermine the integrity of local values. Like maps, 10 laws are cultural texts
which conveniently represent the ideological boundaries and aspirations of

the ruling elite, both spatial and social, and omit or blur the inconvenient or
resistant to control."l Central to this dichotomy between local diversity and
Tac Dong Kinh Te Xa Hoi Cua Doi Moi TrongLinh Vuc Nha 0 Do Thi Vietnam [Social and Economic Impact
ofReforms on City ResidentialAreasin Vietnam], 2 XAHoi Hoc [Soc. REv.] 15, 17-19 (1996).
4 See G. PORTER, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC SOCIALISM 131-37 (1993).
5 Though reforms were formally introduced at the Sixth Party Congress, a progressive fleeing of the
centrally planned economy had been taking place since 1979. See M. Spoor, State Finance in the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam: The Difficult Transition From State Bureaucratic Finance to Socialist Economic
Accounting, PosT-WAR VwmAM, DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT 111 (David G. Marr & Christine
Pelzer White eds., 1988); ADAM FFORDE & STEFAN DE VYLDER, FROM PLAN TO MARKET 65-69 (1996).
6 See TrinhDuy Luon & Nguyen Quong Vinh, supra note 3, at 17-19.
7 Id.
8 See UNDP, FEASBILrTY STUDYON VIETAM LAND MANAOEMENT SYSTEM 72-75 (Oct. 1994); The Gia,
Serious Breaches of the Land Law in Ho Chi Minh, NHAN DAN [THE PEOPLE] Dec. 26, 1995, at 3.
9 See State Media Break Silence on Vietnamese Unrest, Blame Bureaucracy,AP, Sept. 9, 1997.
10 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 234 (1983).
" See B. D. Santos, Law: A Map ofMisreading. Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. LAw
Soc. 279, 282-86 (1987); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 1. LEGAL PLUJRALISM UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 2-
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central legality are issues of pluralism versus particularism, localism versus
centralism, and whether one set of intellectual/cultural traditions will engage
or subordinate another. This article considers these themes in the context of
urban land management in Vietnam.
The discussion is divided into eight parts. Part H critiques changes in
the polycentric division of land management control from the pre-colonial
period until the present. Part III examines legal pluralist theory, evaluating
means of mapping the boundaries of state and non-state legal subsystems.
Parts IV and V respectively consider case studies dealing with the
legalization of land use rights and compulsory acquisition. A further case
study relating to court decisions dealing with land boundary disputes is
located in Part VI. Part VII discusses, in the context of the case studies,
whether legal plurality is a function of cultural plurality. Part VIII concludes
that although legal pluralism is useful in drawing attention to bifurcated land
management practices, by emphasizing difference, it de-emphasizes the
political, economic, and cultural pathways that determine social action.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND USE SUBSYSTEMS

Land in Vietnam provides more than shelter and support: it forms a
mythic and legitimizing basis for communal ties 12 and state legitimacy. 13 In a
myriad of permutations, local precepts are interwoven with foreign
influences--Chinese, French Colonial, socialist, contemporary East Asian and
Western-forming complex and amorphous land use patterns. Constructed
from different systems of knowledge, the new overlaying the old, 4
contemporary land policy is a product of historical processes. These new
concepts usually inform the "official law," which is superimposed over the
5 (1986) (stating that the concept of law based on state power is an ideological myth); contra Brian Z.
Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J. L. SOC. 192, 195-99 (1993)
(arguing that rules exists within social structures, but is not law without a link to the state).
12 As an example, the cult of the village guardian spirit symbolized "the history,
customs, ethics,
legal code and common aspirations of the entire village," and gave meaning to community land practices.
NEIL JAMIESON, UNDERSTANDING VIETNAM 29-30 (1993).
13 See Thaveeporn Vasavakul, Vietnam: The Changing Models
of Legitimization, in POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY INSOUTHEAST ASIA 265-68, 284-85 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 1995).
14 See generally Robert McKinley, Zaman dan Masa, Eras and Periods: Religious Evolution
and
the Permanence of EpistemologicalAges in Malay Culture, in THE IMAGINATION OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIAN COHERENCE SYSTEMS 306 (A. Becker & A. Yengoyan eds., 1979); A. Terry Rambo,
Black Flight Suits and White Ao-Dais: Borrowingsand Adaptations of Symbolism of Vietnamese Cultural
Identity, in BORROwINGs AND ADAFTIONs INVIETNAMESE CULTURE 121-22 (Center for Southeast Asian
Studies ed., 1987).
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pre-existing habits and practices that comprise the "unofficial law."' 15 This
section traces the interaction of central "official law" and local "unofficial
law" in land use management from imperial rule to the contemporary period.
A.

The Origins of Local-CentralBifurcation

Traditional land use in Vietnam straddled the two social interfaces of
imperial-village and village-family. 16 Of these central-local relationships
(tran uong-dia phuong), the least porous interface divided imperial

patrimony, which treated land as a "gift from heaven," from village/clan
customs.' 7 To varying degrees both central level official law and local level

unofficial law are based on postulates drawn from a syncretic mix of neoConfucian, Taoist, Buddhist and local animistic beliefs known18 as tam giao
dong nguyen, which reduce the three religions into one source.
Imperial Codes required the Mandarin bureaucracy (quan vien) to only

deal with village based Councils of Notables (hoi dong tien chi) and not with
their constituent memlbers.'

9

This central system revolved around official

law. Village leaders interacted with families and clans, but not individuals.
Provided village chiefs (xa truong) paid taxes and satisfied labor quotas, the
main preoccupations of official law,2 ° central authorities generally permitted

" Official law is the legal system sanctioned by the legitimate authorities, while unofficial law is
comprised of underlying community habits and practices that may support or subvert the official law. These
concepts were developed to explain the reception of Western transplanted law mn Japan. See Masaji Ciba,
Introduction, in ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW: AN INTRODUCTION WITH REEIVED LAW 1, 5-6 (Masaji Chiba ed.,
1986); cf F. Von Benda-Bectnann, Symbiosis oflndigenou, and Western Law in Africa andAsia:An Ersay, in
LEGAL PLURALISM N EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW: THE ENCOUNTER OF EUROPEAN AND INDIGENEOUS LAW IN
19TH AND 20TH CENTURY AFRICA AND ASIA 307-25 (W. Mommsen et al. eds., 1992).
6 The term "traditional" is usually reserved for the customs, psychological, and religious beliefs of

pre-colonial Vietnamese. See JAMIESON, supra note 12, at 11-12.
7 Adopting a Sino-Vietnamese conception as first envoy from heaven, the Emperor imposed
harmony between nature and temporal elements through delegated authority vested in the Mandarins. See
Nguyen Duc Nhuan, Do the Urban Regional Management Policies of Socialist Vietnam Reflect the
Patternsof the Ancient MandarinBureaucracy?, 8 INT'L J.URB. REGIONAL RES. 73, 74-75 (1984).
'g See 0. Walters, Assertions of Cultural Well-being in Vietnam, 10 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD.
435, 44243 (1979); D. MARR, VIETNAMESE ANTI-COLONIALISM 20 (1971); L. Cadiere, Religious Beliefs
and Practices of the Vietnamese, 33 BULLETIN DE LA SOCItTE DES TUDES INDOCHINOISES 1-23 (1958);
Do Thai Dong, Modifications of the TraditionalFamily in the South of Vietnam, 3 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 77,
80-81 (1993).
19 See, e.g., GIALONG CODE arts. 64-72 (1812-1945).
20 LifCODE arts. 342-387 (1428-1788); see John Whitmore, Social Organisation and Confucian
Thought in Vietnam, 15 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 296, 301 (1984); JAMIESON, supra note 12, at 29-30.
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22
21
unofficial law based on village rules, rituals, and familial status hierarchies
to determine land allocation. 23
Family land use (tu dien) could only
imperfectly be described as ownership.24 Although individuals and families
asserted rights of use through occupation and cultivation, village authorities
guided 25 agricultural production, confiscating temporarily abandoned or
uncultivated land.26 Land had no market value in a society where occupation
rights were determined as much by family rituals and mysticism, as they were
by pragmatic concerns regarding access to water, labor and stable rice
production.27 Use and control were coterminous, excluding the possibility of

commodification.
Early Hanoi echoed the imperial-village cultural divide.

A densely

built urban precinct, housing villagers, artisans and traders, partially encircled
the walled Imperial Citadel in Thang Long (later renamed Hanoi). 28 Even the
settlements' names implied bifurcation; Thang Long designated the royal seat
of power, while the Vietnamese term Ke Cho (market people) applied to the
periphery.

Much of the literature in this area treats the imperial bureaucracy and
village structures as ideal types. Little is written about the legal relationship
21 The traditional practices were sometimes codified into written Charters (huong uoc). See Statute

of the Giap of Nam Thuong, Bang Liet Commune, Thruong Tin District (1875), available in 1 VIETNAM
STUD. 209-2214 (1980).
22 Hierarchies were governed by gender, age, education and the number of mouths to feed. Families
were structured according to neo-Confucian principles where each family operated like a small nation,
while the village system was the family system raised to a higher level. See Neil L. Jamieson, Towards a
Paradigm for Paradox: Observations on the Study of Social Organization in Southeast Asia, 15 J.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 320, 327 (1984).
23 The huong hoa (family land) passed automatically to the eldest son on the death of the father.
24 Ownership is, of course, a relative concept. In traditional Vietnam, no one had the right to let
land lie fallow. If land was cultivated, the village head acting as an intermediary for Imperial officials
levied taxes. See J. Adams & N. Hancock, Land and Economy in Traditional Vietnam, 1 J. SOUTHEAST
ASIAN STUD. 90-91 (1970); see also Minh Quang Dao, History of Land Tenure in Pre-1954 Vietnam, 23 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 84, 85 (1993).
25 All male village members belonged to a giap (neighborhood associations) which guided family land
control. See To Lan, On Communal Land in the Traditional Viet Village, 1VIETNAMESE STUD. 44-51 (1980).
26 If the family left the village, the Council of Notables assigned cultivation rights to others, but
within a statutory prescription period rights could be reasserted by the original users. During the 19th
century, village rules coexisted in a complex interrelationship with the Nguyen Code (1813-1945). For
example, owners of land lost occupancy if they failed to cultivate and inhabit land beyond a prescription of
thirty years among relatives or twenty years among non-relatives. L CODE art. 387. While the emperor
had few rights of governance over family land, he retained effective control over one form or communal
land (cong dien). Adams & Hancock, supra note 24, at 93-97.
27 Adams & Hancock, supra note 24, at 92-93, 95-98
n See ANDRt MASSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF HANOI, 1873-1888, 9-20, 37-49 (Daniel F.
Doeppers ed., 1983); see generally Charles Fouriau, Le Phenomene Urbain au Vietnam a L Epoque
Coloniale, in PENINSULE INDOCHINOISE ETUDES URBAINES, 167, 169-72 (P.B. LaFont ed., 1991).
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between the two, or the profound regional variations, particularly between the
North and South.2 9 Most sources focus on the cultural division between the
systems. For example, it is often written that attempts by the Nguyen
Dynasty to implement their vision for an orderly and morally homogenous
Confucian society conflicted with relatively flexible, loosely structured local
organizations. 30 Local institutions are generally depicted as states within a
state, uniting to confront external enemies, while reverting to loosely
structured entities when threats subsided. 31 Not surprisingly, the interaction
between official and unofficial law was never static. The legal codes of the
Le Dynasty (1428-1788) and especially the Nguyen Dynasty (1813-1945)
were used to penetrate village centered unofficial law, further widening the
underlying elite-peasant dichotomy. But official law met resistance at the
local level. For example, stern sino-legal principles limiting wives' influence
over the sale of family property, enshrined in the Gia Long (Nguyen Dynasty
Criminal Code), never entered popular village practice.32 At the same time
villagers only reluctantly petitioned Mandarins to intervene in especially
intractable land disputes.33
Behind the familiar injunction Phap vua thua le lang ("the laws of the
emperor give way to the customs of the village"), extremely complex and
dynamic clan and patronage networks linked the center and periphery. As a
colonial adage infers, "If a man becomes a mandarin, his whole lineage can
ask favors of him" (Mot nguoi lam quan, ca ho duoc nho), many of the
approximately two thousand mandarins serving at any one time breached
criminal provisions by bending central rules (luat mem) to advance family and
local interests.34 Then, as now, particularistic networks linking central and
local officials were a closely guarded secret, but suggest the infiltration of
unofficial law into the official legal system. The direct allocation of commune

29

See K.W. Taylor, Regional Conflicts Among the Viet Peoples Between the 13th and 19th

Centuries 2, 14-18 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
30 See ALEXANDER B. WOODSIDE, VIETNAM AND THE CHINESE MODEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
NGUYEN AND CH'ING CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH

CEMNTRY 60-66, 94-98 (1971).

31 Interview with Hoang Ngoc Hien at the Nguyen Du School of Creative Writing, in Hanoi (Oct.

16 1997) [hereinafter HOANG NGoc HIEN INTERVIEW].

32 See ROBERT LINGAT, LES REGIMES MATRIMONIAUX Du SuD-EST DE L'ASIE: Essm DE DROIT

COMPARE INDOCHINOIs 30-36, 93-96 (1952).

Many of the U CODE provisions were applied by the

population as customary rules during the Nguyen dynastic period. See NGUYEN Nooc HuY & TA VAN
TAI, THE U CODE: LAW INTRADITIONAL VIETNAM 475-76 (1987).
33 See WOODSIDE, supra note 30, at 155-56.
34 Id. at 178-79.
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land by the Emperor to reward services rendered further strengthened and
centralized state power.35
Despite central aspirations of legal dominance, intra-village hierarchies
and networks exerted considerable influence over land use.36 For example, a
French colonial district official discovered that some villages kept both
official and secret internal records of the dien-bo (register of fields), upon
which land tax was assessed, and dinh-bo (register of obligations), upon
which corvee and some personal taxes were based.37 Extensive evidence of
selective enforcement of official law (phap luat) infers a pattern of outward
compliance obscuring covert resistance. Paradoxically, at the same time
village and family heads avoided imperial edicts: they were integral players
in a central administrative structure based on Confucian moral authority
(Li).38 The penetration of Village moral structures by the center can be
gauged by the rapid acceptance of Confucian beliefs after the Imperial court
replaced Buddhism as the state religion in the 14th century.39
The complex, fluid interrelationships between center-local land
management systems resist classification as vertical official law. Imperial
codes and edicts received superficial compliance, but were frequently
subverted by the discretionary authority of the mandarins and village
leaders.4 ° On the other hand, although villagers generally managed their land
according to unofficial law, 41 they also applied neo-Confucian moral
principles that reinforced imperial authority. In fact, village autonomy was
more a function of Imperial forbearance than formalized legal principle.
Because of their proximity to the central authority, urban settlements were
then villages;
more closely regulated and dependent upon the state
42
dealings.
land
suffused
culture
local
distinct
nevertheless a
s See Tran Ti Tuyet, Ve Che Do So Huu Ruong Dat Trong Bo 'Quoc Trieu hinh Luat' [Regime of Land
Ownership in the 'NationalCodes I in NHA Nuoc VA PHA LUAT [STATE AND LAW] 6, 25, 25-26 (1996).
36 See To Lan, supra note 25, at 102-11.
31 See P. ORY, LA COMMUNE ANNAMITE AU TONKIN (1894).

38 This system was based on the metaphor of Emperors as fathers and villages as sons. For a
discussion about Confucian social control, see D. 'BODDE,LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 299-315 (1973); see
also JAMIESON, supra note 12, at 38-40.
39 See WOODSIDE,supra note 30, at 25-30.
40 For example, urban commerce was regulated to some extent by imperial codes governing matters

like fair trade. However, the right to trade depended upon authorization from phuong authorities and
consent from mandarins. See Nhuan, supra note 17, at 77-80.
41 See, e.g., Statute of the Giap of Nam Thuong, Bang Liet Commune, Thuong Tin District (1875),
amend, art. 2, available in 1 VIETNAMESE STUD. 240 (1980).

42 By the 17th Century, Hanoi had a population of between sixty and a hundred thousand people,
organized into thirty-six phuongs (districts), each with its own council of notables, guardian spirit, and
charter (huong uoc ). During the fifteenth century, there were twenty-nine "urban" phuongs throughout
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In summary, far from the strict vertical relationships implied by
imperial codes and neo-Confucian literature, a polycentric combination of
official and unofficial law governed land use. The balance between these
competing power structures was a function of patron-clientism, ethnicity and
distance from the seat of power. The preoccupation of nation-states with
geo-political territorial claims awaited French colonization.
B.

The Impact ofLegal Rationality

Like the Nyugen Emperors, the French imported foreign legal theories
into rural and urban land practices in Cochin China (1867) and Annam and
Tonkin, (1884). 43
Unlike their predecessors, French laws proclaimed
territorial and jurisdictional dominance.
French laws also addressed
individuals instead of corporate villages. By defining the legal boundaries of
public-private power, citizens could theoretically enlist private rights to curb
state power-a novel concept in a society primarily governed by Confucian
moral principles. 44
French legal authority was derived in principle through treaty with the
Vietnamese emperor. 45 That authority rested on the misconception that like
European states, emperors enjoyed eminent domain over all lands. 46 As
previously argued, under imperial rule unofficial law received both formal and
informal recognition. Impervious to the existing legal culture, and propelled
by an unwavering conviction in the superiority of Western moral standards,47
colonial law changed the central organizing principle of political-legal
relations-the limited application of direct imperial rule in the xalphuong
("commune level administrative unit")-by insisting that central laws have
universal applicability.48 Recognizing the undesirability, much less the
Vietnam, compared with some eighty-nine hundred rural villages. See Whitmore, supra note 20, at 301;
Nhuan, supra note 17, at 77-79.
43 See M.B. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 153-61 (1978) [hereinafter
HOOKER, CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY]; M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL
AND NON-COLONIAL LAWS 232-35 (1975) [hereinafter HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM].
4 See generally S.E. Finer, Problems of the Liberal-DemocraticState: An HistoricalOverview, 25
GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION 334, 335-43, 347-54 (1990); Roger Cotterrell, The Law of Property and
Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 81, 81-98 (William Twining ed., 1986).
45 See Nguyen, The Anh, The Vietnamese Monarchy Under French Colonial Rule 1884-1945,
19
MOD. ASIAN STUD. 147, 147-51 (1985).

46 See Dao, supra note 24, at 88-89.

47 See MfILTON OSBORNE, THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN COCHINCHINA AND CAMBODIA:
RULE AND

RESPONSE (1859-1905), 78-79 (1969).
48 In the West, political legitimacy rests upon legal domination, a system compromised where more
than one legal system exists. Cf HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 229-30 (on the diverse
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impossibility of directly applying French law to the Vietnamese population, a
system of legal pluralism 49 partially mitigated the impact of legal absolutism.
A complex conflict of laws established points of intersection between
transplanted colonial laws, imperial codes, and customary rituals. 5a Land
transactions concerning Europeans and Vietnamese with French citizenship
proceeded under French colonial law, while other transactions remained
generally within the orbit of pre-existing rules. 5'
Legal pluralism was in practice disregarded where local land practices
conflicted with colonial policy. For example, Vietnamese urban land use
patterns did not form a part of the grand design to transform Hanoi into a
capital "worthy of a great colony. '' 52 The introduction of title by registration
under Torren's Law and hypothkques (mortgages) 5 3 enabled the French to
safeguard property and security rights for agricultural investors, destabilizing,
but certainly not replacing local land use patterns. 54 To European developers,
tradition-bound xa/phuong land rules were anything but secure, since they

lacked defined boundaries and state rights in rem and in personam.55

nature of Philippine law); Steinberg, Law, Development and Korean Society, 3 J. CoMP. ADMIN. 215,

219-22 (1971) (on the introduction of Western law in Korea).
49 This regime amounted to a narrow form of legal pluralism. Narrow legal pluralism legitimized
colonial authority as the law of general application. This principle was refined into a set of conflict of
laws rules governing articulation between indigenous customary and transplanted positive legal systems.
See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 280-81; Griffith, supra note 11, at 2-5.
50 See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 175-80.

5' French law was not uniformly applied throughout Vietnam. In the South (Cochin-China), the
Vietnamese could voluntarily elect to be bound by French law, but voluntary election was only possible in
the Centre and the north in a narrow range of circumstances. Except in the case of inconsistency, the precolonial Vietnamese imperial codes were deemed to apply to the Vietnamese and Chinese, by virtue of
Arrete, Chef Du Pouvoir Ex6cutifde laRepublique Frangaise, Aug. 23, 1871. Another difference between
the south and the rest of the country was the widespread introduction of the Torrens law system of title by
registration. This system appears not to have proceeded beyond major urban centers in the north by the
time of the Geneva Conference of 1954. See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supranote 44, at 167-70.

52 See Erneit Hdbrad, L'urbanisme en Indochine, in L'URBANISME AUX COLONIES ET DANs LES

PAYS TROPICAUX, 278, 282-3 (Jean Roger ed., 1932).

53 By a Decree of July 31, 1925, and an Amendment Decree of Nov. 23, 1926, provisions of the
Civil Code dealing with the transmission of rights in immovable property were introduced in France,
Cochin-China and Tonkin. Unlike the pre-colonial dien, the colonial hypotheque enabled moneylenders
to assume ownership on default. See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supranote 44, at 160.

54 Representing two and one half percent of landholders, French colonials and wealthy Vietnamese
landlords by the end of the 1930s held 43% of all agricultural land. See Dao, supra note 24, at 84, 90; see
generally, JOEL S. MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES 57-66 (1988).

(Similar policies were

perused by the Dutch in the East Indies with the Agrarian Law 1870 and the British in northern India
with the Proclamation of 1858).
55 The manner of acquiring and losing property rights formed the cornerstone of the French Civil
Code. See C. Uawy, The Code and Property, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD

162, 170-76 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956).
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Through the mediation of compliant village notables, French officials
applied the Gia Long Code to local land users. 6 Although cognizable to
French legal theory, the vague and hortative Gia Long Penal Code was
unsuitable as positive law. For example, dia bo tax registers were never
invested with the precision needed to function as legally binding land
registers.5 7 The transformation of imprecise land boundaries into official law
converted loose cultural assertions of land control into abstract rights
58
protected by state authority.
Given the jurisprudential position that colonial law represented acts of
state, the continued existence of unofficial law constituted an on-going
challenge to French territorial sovereignty.5 9 By the 1930s, French law, aided
by vastly improved transport and telecommunications, extended central
authority into villages and phuongs to an extent unrealized during imperial
rule. Compliant village officials shifted the axis of center-local land control
from the state-village interface, to a state-family/individual interface. This
shift further eroded village claims to organizational and legal autonomy.
By the end of the colonial period, traditional patterns of land use
coincided with pockets of strong French influence in urban centers and
plantations. Particularly in urban areas a process of cultural symbiosis
infused traditional patterns of social organization with Western rationalism
and natural rights theory.60 However, for all but a tiny francophone elite, 6'
external deference to official law cloaked internal adherence to traditional
unofficial law. This disjunction between law as written and as practiced
flourished in a pluralistic legal system that tolerated official and unofficial
law. Located on the periphery of the colonial legal map, the strong corporate
village structures that had once moderated the behavior of village officials
degenerated. This engendered unprecedented levels of corruption, nepotism
56 See SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN

VIETNAM 184 (1979).
51 These registers were maintained by villages and phuongs as records of the tax liabilities of land users,

they were frequently vague and out of date. Since taxes were levied on the male adult population and not upon
land holdings, tax registers coincided with land ownership. See Nhuan, supra note 17, at 76; Nguyen Ngoc Huy,
The lVetnamese Texts, in THE LAWS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA 465-68 (M.B. Hooker ed., 1986).
Decree of July 31, 1925 and an Amendment Decree of Nov. 23, 1926 introduced a "Torrens

Law" system applicable to immovable property in Cochin-China, Annam and Tonkin. See HOOKER,
LEGAL PLURALISM, supranote 44, at 160.

" See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 246-48 (by basing legal jurisdiction on
nationality and citizenship, French law cannot easily co-exist with customary law).
60 See Hoang Ngoc Hien, The Strength of Culture and The Development of Culture, 4 VIETNAM
SOCIAL SCIENCES 28, 31-33 (1996).
61 See generallyDAVIDMARR, VIETNAMESE TRADITION ON TRIAL 1920-1945, 136-37 (1981).
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and patron-clientism. 62 As traditional village institutions declined, families
increasingly relied on defensive, particularistic means to deal with land.63
Consequently, an already polycentric administrative structure further
fragmented under colonial rule. After independence, the relationship between
the triadic social system (state, village and family) radically changed in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("DRV") and to a lesser extent in the
Republic of Vietnam.
C.

Socialist Legality-CentralIdeology?

Like other modernizing nation-states, on coming to power in 1954, the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Vietnam Worker's Party (VWP) set
about extending central control over the periphery. 64 Though sharing the
colonial goals of political and legal domination, the methods used by the
VWP to transform economic, class, gender, and generational attitudes could
hardly have differed more from French legalism.
Initially drawing from radical Maoists and later the Soviet
experience,65 VWP rhetoric extolled the use of "rational, progressive socialist
legislation" to methodically supplant and replace ancient imperial rules and
colonial laws.66 Along with speeches, newspaper articles and other
ideological outlets, "rational legislation" was one of many methods used to
implement party policy. Tainted by its close association with the despised
colonial regime, legalism was rejected in favor of socialist nationalism 67 and
the neo-Confucian principle of chinh nghia ("exclusive righteousness or just
cause") 68 to legitimize state action. Contrary to colonial notions of state
62 According to one commentator, those who accepted office, "far too often took advantage of their
positions to achieve mutual gain." OSBORNE, supra note 47, at 71, 87; JAMES SCOTT, THE MORAL
ECONOMY OF THE PEASANTS 184 (1976).
63 Though administrative structures were fundamentally changed by French rule, village land use

remained tradition-bound, with little reference to normative law. See HY. V. LUONG,

REVOLUrION IN THE

VILLAGE 55-79 (1992).
64 See CONST. Preamble (1946). The 1946 Constitution selectively quoted from the 1791 French

Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizens and from the American Declaration of Independence 1776.
BERNARD FALL, HO CHI MINH ON REVOLUrION 139-43 (1967); CONST. Arts. 3, 22, 42 (1960).
65 See J. HAZZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 180 (1969); cf. William J. Duiker, Ideology and

Nation-Building in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 17 ASIAN SURVEY 413, 414-16 (1977) (arguing
that the Vietnamese followed a strategy which synthesized Soviet and Chinese experience).
(6 See George Ginsburgs, The Genesis of the People's Procuracy in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, 5 REV. SOCIALISTL. 187, 195 (1979).
67 See Vasavakul, supra note 13, at 265-68, 281-83.
68 See JAMIESON, supra note 12, at 316-18. When transformed to serve Communist policy, chinh

nghia meant not having anything to hide from the party, or allowing personal interests to conflict with
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authority resting on the rule of law,69 political justifications for state power in
70

Vietnam were based on ideological infallibility and legal subordination.

The postulates underlying the new official law differed from those informing

unofficial law.
Although

the party

enlisted local support for a "new

social

relationship" by selectively appropriating the symbols of village culture, 7' the
moral basis for national development did not emanate from the xa or phuong,
but from nationalistic and neo-Confucian reinterpretations of MarxistLeninism. 72 Ideology and social action, rather than traditional, passive local
practices appealed to a nationalistic party leadership overwhelmingly
recruited from the French educated, urban bourgeois.

73

Party cadre attempted

to engineer new boundaries between the triadic social subsystems (state,
village and family), by applying a grand theory that only partially accorded
with Northern and sharply differed from Southern land use practices.74
Socialist egalitarianism directly contradicted culture-bound lineage loyalties.
Land reform campaigns between 1953 and 1956 not only confiscated
and redistributed land, but also produced a new political and social culture.75
Long-standing equitable notions of basic needs were qualified by
revolutionary and class relationships. The Land Reform Law of 195376 and a
party policy; see NGUYEN KHAI VIEN, TRADITION AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM, BERKELEY 45-52 (1974);
S. Young, VietnameseMarxism: Transition in Elite Ideology, 19 ASIAN SuRv. 770, 774-75 (1979).
69 This concept is based on the social contract between states and civil society which justified the
state's monopoly of legal power provided it was strictly exercised within the constants of political powerthe social contact. See John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A ComparativeAnalysis,
30 STAN. J. INT'LL. 325, 326-29 (1994).
70 Popular slogans during the land reform period encapsulated the anti-legalist spirit, "Better
kill
ten innocent people than let one enemy escape," and "party members go first, the nation follows." (Dang
vieu di truoc, lang nouc di sau). These uncompromising views were not without their critics, but even
modest calls to base state action on legal principles were at this time ignored. Interviews with Pham Huu
Chi, former Legal Adviser to the Minister of Justice, in Hanoi (Jan.-Feb. 1993, Jan.-Feb. 1994)
[hereinafter PHAM HUU CHI INTERVIEWS].
71 See Nguyen Khai Vien, supra note 68, at 24.
72 See Duiker, supra note 65, at 415-17; Young, supra note 68, at 770-74.
13 See WILLIAM DUIKER, THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN VIETNAM 1900-1941, 217, 259, 274 (1976);
MARR supra note 61, at 131, 374-76.
14 See E. Moise, Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam, 49 PAC. AFFAIRS 70, 72 (1976); JOHN
MACALISTER & PAUL Mus, THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR REVOLUTION 88-89, 95-98 (1970).
75 See William Kaye, A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam, 9 CHINA Q. 82, 8486 (1962) (describing how land reform was introduced to assert ideological control); contra D. Gareth
Porter, The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered, 5 BULL. CONCERNED
ASIAN SCHOLARS 2, 8-12 (1972) (land reform was introduced to liberate peasants from starvation. Wide
scale abuses, however, by corrupt and over zealous cadre went unchecked from 1953 until 1956).
16 Luat Cai Cach Ruong Dat (Dec. 1953) [Law on Land Reform (Dec. 1953)], CONG BAo
[GOVERNMENT GAZETrE No. 1, 1954].
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series of implementing decrees 77 contained detailed guidelines which divided
the rural and urban population along class-lines into landlords, rich peasants,
middle peasants, poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and the urban
proletariat. 78 In broad terms, confiscation (tich tU) 7 9 was reserved for the
colonialists, traitors and
worst enemies of the party and masses:
s
reactionaries. o Requisitioning (trung thu) produced the same result, but
implied a lesser degree of miscreance.81 Government acquisitions (trung
mua), though providing little compensation, denoted a higher level of
probity.8 2 Those considered wealthy, but not exploitative "felt obliged" to
donate their property to the state. 3 Most communal and religious land was
either requisitioned or purchased. 84

Property confiscated in Hanoi from "colonialists, traitors and
reactionaries," or managed on behalf of Vietnamese who fled to the south in
1954, was in principle allocated according to need or to relatives of the
"temporarily absent owners."8 5 Commentators describe a less orderly
process where relational obligations
to party cadre and relatives infiltrated
86
informed decision-making.

7 Luat Cai Cach Ruong Dat (Dec. 1953)[Law on Land Reform (Dec. 1953)], CONG BAO
Chi Dinh so 471 TTg Phan Dinh Thanh Phan Gia Cap O Nong Thon (Mar.
1955) [Regulations no. 471 Trg on Class Demarcation in the Countryside (Mar. 1955)], CoNG BAO
[GOVERNMENT GAZETTE]; Thong Tu So 1196-Tlg Phan Dinh Tharth Phan Giai Cap O Nong Thon (Dec.
1956) [Decree no. 1196-Trg on Class Demarcation in the Countryside (Dec. 1956)], CONG BAO
[GOVERNMENT GAZETrE];

[GOVERNMENT GAZETTE].
" See generally Moise, supra note 74, at 71-73; Christine White, Mass Mobilization and Ideological
Transformationin the ,ietnamese Land Reform Campaign, 13 J. CONTEMP. AsIA 75, 77-79 (1983).
'9 See Porter, supra note 75.

go Articles 25 to 30 of the Decree on Agrarian Policy (Apr. 20, 1953), the preamble to the Law on
Land Reform 1953, authorized confiscation and redistribution to ladles peasants. See BERNARD B. FALL,
THE VIET-MINH REGIME: GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

125-26 (1956); EDWIN MOISE, LAND REFORM INCHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM (1983).

8' Law on Land Reform art. 3 (1953).
82 Id. at art. 4.

83 See White, supra note 78, at 78-80.

84 Law on Land Reform arts. 15, 16, 17 (1953).

85 In practice, "need" favored rural cadres and veterans of the French War of Resistance. The
internal guidelines were never published and are still not publicly available. But in general an area of
four square meters was allotted per person, those of high (but unspecified) rank were granted more space.
See Decree 600 Ttg on Class Demarcation in Urban Areas (Nov. 1955) (on file at the Ministry of Justice
Information Centre).
86 Interviews with the late Phan Huu Chi, former Chief Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, in
Hanoi (1992-1994); Interviews with Nguyen Thuc Bao, former Director of the House and Land
Department (pre and post 1954), in Hanoi (1996, 1997).
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Distinguishing official and unofficial law during the decades following
independence is problematic. 7 The Law on Land Reform of 1953,8 and the
subsequent Constitution of 1960,89 authorized occupants "to transmit land to
their heirs, to mortgage, to sell, to give away, etc." 90 In practice official laws
were subordinated by political and legal postulates that classified occupants
according to class-based moral imperatives.
Attempts to avoid the
redistribution of property by exercising statutory rights of transfer lacked
socialist probity, despite complying with the letter of the law. This

contradiction between state land management and private ownership91
illustrates the extent to which socialist ideology triumphed over legality.
Eventually political practice and legal theory converged when the postreunification Constitution of 1980 vested all rights in land in the state. 92
Determined to avoid the asymmetrical center-local relations of colonial
times, the party exhorted cadre implementing land policy not to dictate from
above, like "revolutionary mandarins." 93 By adopting "model behavior"
(guong mau) that relied on personal relations to reduce the distance between
officials and locals, cadre were partially successful in overcoming resistance
to unfamiliar class ideology. 94 Like the imperial rulers, the party primarily

ruled through moral, rather than legal principles.
Mass educational
campaigns further blurred the distinction between formal law and party
policy.95

Even at the height of collectivization, the state did not, and could not,
entirely supplant local customary land practices. Land management during
87

See, e.g., Hoang Quoc Viet, Development of the Agrarian reform Movement in Vietnam, Aug. 25,

1954, F.B.I.S.E. ASIA DAILY REP., at CCC 1-10 (Sept. 8, 1954).
s A system of local government was reestablished to replace land administrative structures allowed
to deteriorate during the French War. Central line-ministries (bo chu quan), ruled at the national level,
urban centers were led by city-level people's committees (Uy ban nhan Dan), and these were further
subdivided into district-level people's committees, and Rural Communes (Xa)and urban phuongs were
the smallest administrative units. See George Ginsburgs, Local Government and Administration in the
DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam Since 1954 (pt. 2), 14 CHINAQ. 195, 195-97 (1963).
89
VIETNAM CONST. art. 19 (1960).

90 Law on Land Reform art. 31 (1953).
91 See Trinh Duy Luan and Nguyen Quang Vinh, supra note 3, at 17-18.
92 VIETNAM CONST. art. 19 (1980).
93 Cadre were warned to avoid laziness (benh luoi bieng), boasting (benh ba hoa), "narrowmindedness" (benh hep hoi), "commandisim" (loi menh lenh), "bureaucratism" (loi quan lieu), the
excessive use of Sino-Vietnamese words (benh dung chu Han) and "arrogance" (benh kieu ngao). See
generally NGUYEN KHAI VIEN, supra note 68, at 48-50.
94 See Interzone Five Implements Agrarian Law, 4 VOICE OF VIETNAM, May 4, 1954, F.B.I.S. E.
ASIA DAILY REP., at CCC 13-14 (May 12, 1954); White, supra note 78 at 75-79.
95 See White, supra note 78, at 75-76; Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, Village State Relations in
Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politicson Decollectivization, 54 ASIAN STUD. 402-05 (1995).
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this period can best be described as polycentric and fragmented. Although
unofficial law never received official recognition, Adam Fforde and Ben
Kerkvliet have shown that in practice a quiet, sometimes covert process of
negotiation and compromise developed between officials and villagers that
reconciled central land laws and policies with local practices (unofficial
law). 96 Following the break-down of bureaucratic and penal control
mechanisms after reunification, spontaneous local land use patterns expanded,
co-existing with, and to a certain extent were tolerated by the state. By the
time of the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, the disruption of97 center-local
relations forced profound economic and legal reforms (doi moi).
The Post Doi Moi State ManagedLand ControlSystem

D.

Land practices legitimized by, but predating doi moi reforms, quickly
outmoded the transitional Law on Land of 1988.98 The states renewed
interest in regularizing and unifying land management, first flagged in the
1988 Law, has been carried over to the Law on Land of 1993. As a
concession to the emerging mixed market economy, the new Law now
recognizes certain kinds of private interests in land, which can be transferred,
leased and encumbered, without disturbing the underlying principle of state
Administrative policy has changed and the past
ownership of land.
ambivalence towards urban development has given way to an understanding
that cities play a catalytic role in Vietnam's modernization (hien dai hoa).99
The Law on Land of 1993 established six principles governing land
management: (1) the land belongs to the entire people; 00 (2) the land is
uniformly administered by the state;' 0' (3) which promotes effective and
economical use of land. 0 2 Further, (4) the state protects agricultural land; (5)
96 Land was routinely, but illegally, sold during this period. See Adam Fforde, Law and Socialist
Agricultural Development in Vietnam: The Statute for Agricultural Producer Cooperatives, 10 REv.
SOCIALIST L. 315, 317-19 (1984); Kerkvliet, supra note 95, at 402-05.
9' Only vague intonations of a socialist orientated market economy are forthcoming, but in all its
manifestations, a continuing role for central government management over land, production, labor and
distribution is ensured. The state owned sector is also promoted as the corner stone of the economy. See
Nguyen Phu Trong, Market Economy and the Leadership of the Party, TAP CHI CoNo SAN [COMMUNIST
REVIEW], Jan. 1994, F.B.I.S. E. AsIADAILY REP. 94-058, at 52-54 (Mar. 25, 1994).
98 See FFORDE& VYLDER, supra note 5, at 6-10.

99 While comprising only 20% of the population, urban centers contribute about 40% of the GDP.
See Luu Bich Ho & Tran Thanh Binh, Processof Urbanization Until The Year 2010, 5 VIETNAM'S SOCIoECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 33, 34 (1996).
100 Law on Land art. t (1993).
101

Id.

102

Id. art.4.
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encourages investment in land;103 and (6) stipulates the value of land. 1°4
While retaining ultimate control over legislation and policy, the central state
has devolved land management to local government bodies called "people's
committees." City level people's committees, for example, possess broad
discretion to allot land use rights in urban areas. 10 5 Local authorities are also
responsible for promulgating zoning and land use regulations, registration and
settling some kinds of land use disputes. °6 The major innovation introduced
by the Law on Land of 1993 is state recognition of household/individual
(including legal persons) rights in land. The semi-autonomous villagefamily/household relationship is no longer a legal possibility.
Echoing pre-colonial usufruct rights, land use rights (quyen su dung
dat) convey an extensive private right of disposal (vat quyen) 10 7 that has
allowed the formation of residential land markets.108 Though falling short of
full ownership, land use rights certificates issued for domestic dwellings'0 9
are perpetual, freely transferable,1 10 and inheritable."' There is no policy
objection to the outright ownership of buildings.
Attempts to reconcile state ownership of land with security of tenure
have engendered some legal particularities. It is still unclear in law, for
example, whether ownership of buildings automatically conveys rights to the
sub-stratum, and which title, land or building, prevails where there is a missmatch of tenures. Urban residential buildings are unaffected by this problem.
Officials now privately concede that land use rights are automatically
conveyed with ownership of residential buildings, a policy that effectively
creates de facto fee simple estates in residential land." 2

103

Id. art.5.

o Id art 12; Decree Stipulating the Price List For Categories of Land, No. 87 CP, art 2 (Aug. 17, 1994).
105 For a detailed discussion of land management discretion see John Gillespie, The Role of the
Bureaucracyin Managing Urban Land in Vietnam 5 PAC. RIM L. POL'Y J. 59, 82-86 (1995).
" Law on Land arts. 8, 13-14 (1993).
107 See Ha Mai Hien, Discussion on the Ways of Exercising Ownership in Our Country, NHA Nuoc
VA PHAP LUAT [STATE AND LAW] 2, 35, 37-38 (1995). These rights approximate Western rights in rem.
'0o See, Real Estate Markets FinallyAppear in HCM City, VIET NAM NEWS Oct. 30, 1997 at 2.
109 Law on Land arts. 3, 20, 73,79; Decree on Dwelling House Purchase and Sale, No. 61-CP, arts.

3-4 (July. 5, 1994), Decree Prescribing The Implementation of the Ordinance on the Rights and
Obligations of Domestic Organizations with Land Assigned or Leased by the State, No. 85-CP, art. 11
(Dec. 17, 1996).
110 CIVIL CODE art. 693 (1996).
'" Id. art. 637 (2).

,12 Interview with Mai Xuan Yen, Chief Inspector for the Land Administration Department, in
Hanoi (Oct. 27, 1997); Interviews with officials on Hanoi People's Committee of the House and Land
Department, in Hanoi (Oct. 28. 1997, Nov. 9, 1997).
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Tenure disjunction remains a problem for commercial buildings.
Although improvements to land can be owned in perpetuity, land use rights
allotted for commercial purposes have a limited duration of twenty to fifty
years and are not transferable without state approval." 3 Land interests are
classified according to their economic purposes, and exist by virtue of an
administrative discretion that looks beyond individual needs to broader
societal interests. Other than ensuring the implementation of party-state
development policy, there is no blueprint guiding the unprecedented
legalization of private land holdings. Local experimentation with land
allotment and conversion is encouraged, even when this leads to statutory
breaches. Since success is invariably measured by central policy makers,
local reforms that reinforce central imperatives are considered
experimentation, while those that advance local interests risk classification as
vuot roa (fence breaking). The case studies considered in Part IV should be
read against this complex political backdrop.
III.

CONCEPTUALIZING CENTER-LOCAL LAND MANAGEMENT

A.

Central-LocalDisjunction in Vietnamese Land Management

The preceding discussion suggests an ongoing cycle of integration and
rupture underlying land contests between Vietnam's three social
subsystems-state, xa/phuong and family. There is little doubt that centerlocal relations were highly asymmetric during the pre-colonial period.
However, despite the appearance of a rigid hierarchical structure, unofficial
law (xa/phuong) formed an integral element of the imperial administrative
structure. Like other neo-Confucian societies, social control was primarily
1 14
exerted through moral and personal persuasion, rather than legal devices.
French legal practice unsuccessfully attempted to displace unofficial law with
transplanted positive laws, such as Torrens' Law of title by registration and a
hypotheque security system. French law formalized and accentuated the
disjunction between rights-based market laws and the symbols and rituals of
unofficial law. 15 The colonial government tried to tap into existing village
13

Interview with Nguyen Khai, Head of the Legislation Inspection Section, General Department of

Land Administration, in Hanoi (Sept. 9, 1994, Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter NGUYEN KHAI INTERviEW].
114

See generally XiN REN, TRADmON OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADmON 19-36 (1997).

"' "Ifthe law is at odds with the values of society, the law falls into disrepute and loses the force it
needs to ensure uniformity with its precepts."

Gerard Brennan, Law in Search of Principle, 9 J.

CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 259, 259 (1993); see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 206-15
(1986) (conformity with cultural norms confers legitimacy on law.)
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organizations, but only succeeded in undermining the organizational and

cultural structures that created, justified, and oriented unofficial law. In the
end, colonial attempts to make rights-based legislation the law of general
application augment revolutionary pressures. Although Socialist policymakers relied on familiar patterns of moral guidance, land management
generally followed transplanted Marxist-Leninist principles, rather than local
precepts.
Doi moi reforms attached renewed importance to statutory boundaries
between public and private interests in land. Rather then promoting
uniformity, experimentation with positive law has produced a legal geography
just as divided as the colonial landscape. In some localities compliance with
central law is a fringe phenomenon. Though useful in mapping broad changes
in land management, classifications based on official and unofficial law are
not especially helpful in explaining this disjunction between positive law and
non-conforming land use. If state instrumentalities consistently applied
positive law, land use could be meaningfully evaluated in terms of legality
and illegality. This binary measure breaks down where, as the following case
studies reveal, officials actively subvert central law to produce locally
acceptable outcomes.
In these circumstances the binary nature of
official/unofficial classifications de-emphasize and define out of existence the
subtle symbiosis and interdependence existing between state officials and
land users. A different legal architecture that does not use state authorization
as its central point of reference is needed to evaluate Vietnamese polycentric
legal terrain.
B.

Legal PluralistApproaches to LandManagement

1.

Theory Based on Experience

The history of land control in Vietnam intimates that theoretical
explanations for contemporary land law violations lies in literature concerning
the superimposition of positive law over traditional and relational land use
practices. Experience has largely shaped legal commentary in this area. By
uncritically accepting Weber's'" 6 putative link between positive law and
economic development, those assisting Third World governments to introduce
116See

Sally Ewing Formal Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber's Sociology of Law,

21 L. Soc. REV. 487, 488-93 (1987) (arguing that Weber's link between law and development is more
complex and ambiguous than many of his adherents recognize).
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rights-based land tenure systems11 7 generally assumed that law can be freed
from its social and cultural roots. Primarily working through the regional
elites, they predicted transplanted land title and registration systems would
induce stability and predictability. Positive laws with clear legal boundaries
of land
(at least to the central elite) between public and private spheres
118
systems.
customary
village
and
familial
disrupted
control too often
Working at the other end of the social spectrum, those trained in the
anthropological methods of Malinoski 1t 9 observed firsthand some of the
social problems produced by superimposing transplanted legal values upon
local norms and practices.1 20 For example, land use rights in Vietnam are
issued to the head of households and the most productive farmers. This
policy disproportionately benefits males. 121 When explaining local customary
resistance to unifying central laws, certain commentators adopted the
structural classification of "formal" and "informal" sectors. 122 It was a small
leap from this fragmented legal topography to one comprised of multiple sets
of "stacked" legal subsystems. In structural terms, a pluralistic framework
stacked the positive legal order on top of the "informal," customary social
order.
2.

What Is Legal Pluralism?

Though used in often confusing and contradictory ways, legal
pluralism describes the coexistence of two or more legal systems in the
117 For a critical over view of the movement See David Trubek, Towards a Social Theory of

Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development 82 YALE L J. 1, 6-15 (1972); cf Tamanaha,
supra note 11, at 473-76.
'18 See generally D. Webb, Legal System Reform and Private Sector Development in Developing
Countriesin ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND LAW 55-63 (1996).
19 See Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 209.
120 The literature in this area is extensive. A comprehensive account is found in Griffiths, supra
note 11, at 29-34. Much of the theoretical justification for legal pluralism is drawn from Moore's concept
of semi-autonomous social fields or non-state legal spheres. See R. Sally F. Moore, Law and Social
Change in the Semi-Autonomous, Social Field as on Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. Soc. REv. 719,
720-24 (1973); B. de Sousa Santos, State, Law and Community in the World System: An Introduction, I
SOciALL. STUD. 131, 133-37 (1992).
121 See Ha Thi Phuong Tien, Some Problems About Land and Rural Women in the Stage of
Restructuring, 2 VIETNAM Soc. SCl. 56, 60-61 (1997).
122 See KENNETH KARST ET AL., THE EvOLUTION OF LAW IN THE BARRIOS OF CARACAS, (1973).
(This investigation placed importance on the judicial role of locally appointed juntas de barrios as
arbitrators in cases of legal conflict in squatter settlements in Caracas); contra R. Perez Perdomo et al.,
The Law and Home Ownership in the Barrios of Caracas,in URBANIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN
AMERICA (A. Gilbert ed., 1982). (A subsequent study of the social conditions examined by Karst
suggested that the juntas de barrios' role was minor in comparison to the activities of state officials).
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This description is a precise structural classification

and should not be confused with the vague use of legal pluralism to denote
social and legal diversity.124 Legal pluralism in its narrow form justified
25
dualistic legal systems in colonial and post-colonial countries. 126
Legitimatization for European colonization of non-Christian peoples
rested on religious doctrine that granted all humans a right to salvation-a
doctrine that limited colonial power to travel, trade, settlement, and
proselytizing the Gospel. Colonial authority did not extend to the
abrogation of indigenous cultural practices and laws, unless they
contradicted central law. The reality of conquest was somewhat different.
The French in Indo-China adopted a similar, though less tolerant
formulation that invested central authorities with power to regulate or
prohibit local customs. Peering through the lens of colonial legal
centralism, it is hardly surprising that "narrow" legal pluralism invariably
focused on binary contests between official and unofficial law, deemphasizing 7the subtle integration and infiltration between these
2
subsystems. 1
Narrow legal pluralism takes issue with state law monism, but fails
to reject "the ideology of legal centralism, law is and should be the law of
the state, uniform for all persons exclusive of all other law, and
administered by a single set of state institutions.' 2 8 More recently,
broader notions of legal pluralism place state law in a legal subsystem that
coexists with "non-state" legal subsystems. This characterization echoes
Ehrlich's 129 concern that societies are organized around group activities,
and since each has its own self-regulating system of rules, official law
123 See Griffith, supra note 11, at 24.
124 See, e.g., Alice E. S. Tay and Poh-Ling Tan, Conclusion, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 398-405

(Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997).
125 In the 1970s legal thinking held that legal pluralism arises in colonial or post-colonial societies.
See HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 44, at 2-5.

'26 See THE LAWS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA 28-47 (M.B. Hooker ed., 1986) [hereinafter HOOKER, S.E.

ASIA LAW].

127 In his ground-breaking legal histories of Southeast Asia, Barry Hooker used legal pluralism as a

powerful tool to analyze the development of colonial laws. See generally HOOKER, S.E. ASIA LAW supra
note 127; cf.Daniel Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land Law, 22 YALE J.
INT'L L. 171, 174-76, 194-205, 208-12 (1997). Much of the blame for the failure of Indonesia's Basic
Agrarian Law 1960 to integrate central and local land use patterns is attributed to an inherent
incompatibility between essentially normative central laws and local adat customary practices. Still
located within the state legal system, proposals for reform recommend building and broadening the range
of land registration choices available to adat land holders.
12 See Griffith, supra note 11, at 3.
129 See E. EHRLIcH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 21, 167-68 (1936).
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plays a relatively minor role. Before the development of centralized
nation-states, all societies consisted of interlocking legal orders. 130 Only
after their development did "a single dominating and comprehensive legal
system, coterminous with the territorial reach of the state, come to appear
typical.''
Griffiths, a leading exponent of legal pluralism, finds non-state legal
subsystems coexisting with the state in a social field that encompasses
society as a whole. 132 Internal norms guide members of these subsystems.
Rejecting state law monism, Griffiths accepts Moore's concept of "semiautonomous social fields" as the central core of legal subsystems.
According to Moore,
The semi-autonomous social field is defined and its
boundaries identified not by its organization (it may be a
corporate group, it may not) but by a processual
characteristic, the fact that it can generate rules and coerce or
induce compliance to them. 133
By imagining that social space is comprised of stacked state and non-state
subsystems, legal pluralism invests repetitive beliefs and habits
underrepresented by official law with law-like characteristics that convey
legitimacy. This theoretical position owes much to Durkeim's notion that
law corresponds to its social context. Thus, where rules differ from, or
are comprehensively rejected by society, they are not laws.' 34 However, it
goes well beyond the notion that state law horizontally coexists and is
infused with personal identity and legal postulates such as religion,
philosophy and ideology. 135 From the perspective of central lawmakers,
urban squatters in Vietnam, for example, occupy land outside the orbit of
state-law and bureaucratic processes. However, when reconfigured as

130

See ROGER CoITERRAL,THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 30 (1984).

131

id.

132

See Griffiths, supra note 11, at 38-39.

133See Moore, supra note 120, at 722-73.

134A moral fact is normal for a determined social type when it is observed in the average of that
species. It is pathological in antithetical circumstances. This makes the moral character to the particular
rules vary; that is, they depend upon the nature of social types. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVIsION OF LABOR
INSOCIETY 432 (George Simpson trans., 1964).
135 See M. CHINA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY THROUGH JAPANESE LEGAL

CULTURE 43-46 (1989).
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semi-autonomous social fields, urban squatting assumes legitimacy as a
non-state legal subsystem.

3.

Problems with the Definition of Law

This self-defining 136 path to legitimacy is so appealing that much of the
legal literature concerning the Third World's urban poor dissects land
practices into legal subsystems. 137 Nevertheless, the architecture of state and
non-state legal subsystems generates its own conceptual contradictions. As
Brian Tamanaha13 8 observed, "not only does the term 'law' thereby lose any

distinctive meaning-law in effect becomes synonymous with... other forms
of normative order, like moral or political norms, or customs, habits, rules of
etiquette and even table manners." Though its conceivable that in some
societies table manners are as valuable as property transactions in the West,
this objection does not address Tamanaha's concern that the definitions of
non-state legal subsystems used by legal pluralists accept state law monism as
a given. The conundrum is that most working concepts of law presuppose
differentiated political and legal institutions, ignoring the possibility of law
like processes in undifferentiated customary societies and non-state legal
subsystems. For example, even definitions that recognize "customary or
interactional" law, frequently assume an administration comprised of
specialized personnel. 39 Tamanaha's central difficulty with legal pluralism is
that where non-state legal subsystems coexist with the state subsystem,
established theory linking law to state sanctions must be discarded in favor of
vague anthropological notions of reciprocal and systematic obligations. Put
another way, "Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply
1 40
describing social life?

13'See John Sutton, Rethinking Social Control, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 943, 945-46 (1996) (social

control theories carry connotations of deviance and even criminality, legal pluralism avoids stigmatizing
behavior according to preconceived notions of social conformity and legitimacy).
137 See Sally Engle Meny, Popular Justice and the Ideology of Social Transformation, 1 Soc. LEG. STUD.
161, 163, 166-68 (1992); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed- The Construction &
Reproduction of Legality in Pasargad, 12 L. & Soc'Y REV.93-105 (1977); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many
Rooms: Courts, Private Orderings and Indigenous Law I J. LEGAL PLURASM (1981).
138 See Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 193; see also Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus:
Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1448-1452 (1992).
1'9 See, e.g.,

ROBERTO MANGABECRA

UNGER,

KNOWLEDGE AND

POLITICs (1976);

MALINOWSKI,CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 58-59 (1926 reprint 1985).

BRONISLAN

140 See generally Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 869, 878 (1988);

MALINOWSKI, supra note 139, at 55, 68.
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Forms ofLegal Legitimization

For the architecture of legal pluralism to have analytical power a
consistent means of differentiating state from non-state legal sub-systems
must be found. It is argued below that there is general agreement between
commentators that the boundaries circumscribing all social groups are defined
and reinforced by notions of legitimacy. For example, spontaneous peasant
land reforms may simultaneously be considered illegal insurrections by
central authorities and the reassertion of traditional rights by peasants. Where
the validity of non-state sub-groups is determined by state-centered legal
precepts, land use is polarized into binary opposites-legal and illegal
behavior. If behavior is to avoid being stigmatized according to centrally
conceived notions of social conformity, legitimacy must come from values
and habits outside the state orbit.
But as Tamahana has shown,
anthropologists define the boundaries of semi-autonomous sub-groups
according to concepts of social control, that do not address the factors that
make sub-groups legally distinct from the state and each other. The following
discussion briefly considers how established theories of legal legitimization
define the boundaries of legal systems.
A starting point in determining whether established concepts of legal
legitimization apply to non-state legal systems, is the three possible sources
of political legitimacy identified by Max Weber; namely legal, charismatic
and traditional domination. 141 If law derives its authority from legal
postulates underlying political, ideological and cultural institutions, 42 then
Weber's use of law as an independent basis of authority in its own right is
questionable. For example, Weber' S143 assertion that law is self justifying
and requires no appeal to moral or ideological values, is of doubtful value in
Vietnamese society, which is imbued with the Confucian preference for moral
(Duc Tri or "Rule by Virtue"), rather than legal governance (Phap Tri or
"Rule by Law"). Charisma and tradition are equally improbable sources of
state legitimization in a society ruled by collective party and state

141 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 875 (G.
Roth & C. Wittich eds., 1978).
142See generally Muthiah Alagappa, The Anatomy of Legitimacy, in POLmCAL LEGITIMACY IN

SouTH EAST AsIA 11-14 (M. Alagappa ed., 1995); CHIBA, supra note 135, at 43-6.
143See WEBER, supranote 141, at ch. 3.
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leadership. 144 Nor is there evidence that organized leadership of this kind
violates non-conforming urban land use.
Compliance or coercion is the basis of most sociological definitions of
law. According to Adamson Hoebel "[a] social norm is legal if its neglect or
infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical
force to an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of
so acting.' l4 5 Since this formulation requires some organized system of
enforcement it extends to customary societies lacking formal legal
institutions. It fails, however, to distinguish between elaborate systems of
judicial administration and informal coercion for breaches of internal family
rules.
Shared norms and values are regarded by some as essential in
determining how behavior ought to be structured within societal subExponents of this theory reject habitual obedience as an
groupings.
explanation for legal conformity, 146 believing instead that laws exist as
external propositions until internalized to inform the experience and
perception of individuals. 147 They also assert that legal standards of conduct
are evoked when criticizing others, justifying demands and conceding
criticism and demands. However, until most consent to a common set of
norms, subsystem rules remain too voluntary to qualify as law.
Consent need not be given to the norms embedded in rules, but rather
to the processes and forms of legal power. The difficulty here is determining
which set(s) of external norms have been internalized. "[T]he property rights
regime under which an individual is observed to work is itself an endogenous
variable, chosen by the individual who must invest real resources to secure
and maintain the legally recognized property rights to the land.' 14 8 The range
of choices is immense. "[Rlelationships of a broadly patrimonial type
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed
on rational-legal lines,"'149 while state laws compete with customs, familial
144

Particularly after his death, President Ho Chi Minh was invested with considerable charismatic

authority. See MELANIE BERESFORD, VIETNAM: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 86-89, 95 (1988); cf

Vasavakul, supranote 13, at 288.
145 See A. HOEBEL, LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIvE LEGAL DYNAMICS 28 (1954);
contra Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 199-202 (arguing that all definitions of law except those based on
custommy reciprocity, expressly or impliedly are based on state authority).
146 See H.A.L.HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-37 (1961).
147 Id

14sMichael Carter & Pedro Olinto, Decomposition and Identification of the Impact ofLand Tilling
on Agricultural Productivity in Paraguay, in RESEARCH ON LAND MARKETS IN SOUTH ASIA (Rashid
Faruqee & Kevin Carey eds., 1997).
149

See CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, THIRD WORLD POLITICS 48 (1985).
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and patronage obligations in non-state subsystems to form the moral core of
rules. Since the internalization of external norms involves choice, it is
interesting to speculate to what extent land users, particularly the elderly and
poorly educated, 5 ° guide their behavior by habit, pragmatism, and
expediency) 51 This raises the question whether patterns of behavior induced
by habituation are less legally distinct from those based on rational choice.
Societal consent is also regarded as an essential ingredient of political
and communal authority. When discussing legitimization in communist and
authoritarian regimes, Muthiah Alagappa 5 2 suggests that "[w]hile acceptance
by the citizens would enhance the moral basis and self-esteem of such
regimes, their legitimacy depends on acceptance by state institutions or
'political forces to be found within the circle of power."' This emphasis on
political and moral legitimacy, rather than structural conformity and popular
mandate, accords with Vietnamese notions of state legitimacy. From its
inception, the communist party in Vietnam drew upon neo-Confucian
principles of chinh nghia (exclusive righteousness or just cause) 53 to
legitimize state ideology and law. According to this fusion of Confucianism
and Marxism, the basis of the states claim to monopolize legislative and
administrative power rests on preservation of the interests of the working
class and virtue derived from chinh nghia. In this politicized matrix, the role
of law is to unwaveringly implement the party line without constraining
administrative processes with legalism, the antithesis of the principle of due
process.' 5 4 This doctrine that law is the tool of the ruling party leads to a
highly instrumentalist perception of law that rejects the possibility of non5
state law.
Recently the Public Administrative Reform Program has sponsored
a cautious experiment with administrative accountability.' 5 6 For the first
time in Vietnamese history, an administrative court has been invested with
150

See DAVID MARR, VIETNAMESE YOUTH INTHE 1990s 3-4, 52 (1996).

151 See Alagappa, supra note 142, at 15.
152Id. at 28.
153See Young, supra note 68, at 774-75; Nguyen Khai Vien, supra note 68, at 45-52. (Party chinh

nghia means not having anything to hide from the party, and not allowing personal interests to conflict

with the party.)

114 In Vietnam, social control is still widely perceived as a problem of state control. The
notion of
due process that values the primacy of the individual and that limits state power over individuals does not
enjoy support at either an elite or local level. See PHAM HUU CHI INTERVIEWS, supra note 70.
155 Interview with Nguyen Nhu Phat, Director Center for Comparative Law, Institute of
State and

Law, National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities, in Hanoi (Dec. 28, 1997).
156 See THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, NATIONAL PROGRAMME ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REFORM 1-10 (May 15, 1994).
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a limited jurisdiction to review bureaucratic decisions concerning
commerce, land, and social security.1 57 Although it is too early to make
authoritative assessments, court processes by their very nature cloak the
naked exercise of political power. Legal legitimacy will, however, remain
captive of party policy while the nomenkultra system ensures that party
members are placed in positions of authority in all state organs and the
separation of powers doctrine (tam queyen yu au lap) is not a practical or
theoretical possibility. 5 8
Though legal legitimacy remains relatively unimportant, in the
interests of maintaining popular support, the party line has changed
significantly in response to economic, political, and social forces.'5 The
state uses various conduits to co-opt and assimilate contested local ideals
and values. The most important of these mechanisms are two way flows of60
information channeled through Fatherland Front mass-organizations,1
media commentaries and petitions lodged with local officials. 161 This use
of ideological apparatus and state corporatism 62 to filter dialogue between
the center-local levels of society is a method of elite self-preservation
163
described by Gramsci's concept of "ideological hegemony.'
Although Jurgen Habermas' complex theories extend well beyond
the parameters of this discussion, they nevertheless provide some useful
insights into the legitimacy of legal sub-groups. 164 Unlike Weber,
65
Habermas posits that law is ultimately based on moral principles
"' Interview with Vu Khac Xuong, Chief Judge Administrative Court, in Hanoi (Oct. 28, 1997)
[hereinafter Vu KHAC XUONG INTERVIEW].

1s Interview with Nguyen The Quyen, Lecturer, Law University, Hanoi (Oct. 18, 1997).
159 See Vasavakul, supra note 13, at 265-68, 284-85.

160 I.e., Farmer and Veteran Associations are affiliated with and overseen by the Fatherland Front.
The Fatherland Front is an umbrella organization controlled by the communist party.
161 Recent peasant demonstrations in Thai Binh Province suggest that the current mechanisms used to
convey local approval or disapproval of laws and administrative practices are not parlicularly effective. See Thai
Binl, People'sCouncil Accepts Review, VIETNAM NEWS, Nov. 11, 1997, at 3; Thai Binh Commune Officials

Learn the Hard WayAbout Collective Responsibility, VIETNAM NEWS, Sept 18, 1997, at 5.
162 Corporatism is a system where interest groups are given monopoly responsibilities in return for
compliance or cooperation with the state. See, e.g., Jonathan Unger & Anita Chart China, Corporatism
and the EastAsian Model, 33 AusTL. J. CHINESE AFFAIRS 29, 30-35 (1995).
163 See M. Cain, Gramsci, The State and the Place of Law, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE,
95-118 (D. Sugerman ed., 1983) (stating that ruling elites are strengthened and perpetuated by co-opting

and transforming ideals derived from the local level).
'6' See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND NoRMs: TOWARDS A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW,

426 (1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW]; see also J. HABERMAS, THE
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPACE (1989).
165 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY 261 (Vol. 1, 1984).
(Even in Western Europe, "The particular accomplishment of the possitivation of the legal order consists
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synthesized from exchanges and contests between society and rule
These
makers-a process he terms communicative rationality.'6
the
institutions,
exchanges take the form of rational debates in democratic
67
Legitimization becomes
media, symbolic exchanges, and rituals.
blocked where permitted forms of public debate are based on unqualified
traditions, meta-physical beliefs, or ideology. 168 Where discourse is less
constrained, the contests and compromises needed to legitimize law
collapse the gaps between state and societal values. Legitimization thus
depends on the gap between rules and societal, moral, ideological, and
neither so great as to lose credibility, or too small to
cultural norms being
169
cease being ideals.

Habermas developed his theories in the context of the highly
bureaucratized societies of Western Europe and the former Eastern
Block.170 Admittedly the concentration of state power found in these
societies differs substantially from the polycentric, regionalism in
Vietnam. 17 1 Even so, particularly since the Sixth Communist Party
Congress in 1986, the party-state believes that "[t]he management of the
country should be performed through laws, rather than moral concepts.
The law is the institutionalization of Party lines and policies and a
manifestation of the people's will; and it must be applied uniformly
in displacing problems ofjustification, that is, in relieving the technical administration of the law of such
problems even broad expanses-but not in doing away with them.")
See Jurgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisisof the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of
166
Utopian Energies, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE 100-

18 (1989); Bernhard Peters, On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY
AND LAW 110-16 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 1996). First, communicative rationality is subdivided into two
kinds of "action types." Instrumental action types are discourses and values applied to specific cases as a
type of direct action. For example, demonstrations or labor strikes are instrumental action types. In
contrast, strategic action types justify norms by their ability to guide or influence decisions through
theatrical, symbolic or polemic acts. Naturally, there is some overlap between these categories. Second,
although not excluding the possibility of symbolic, religious and mythical communication, Habermas
maintains that it is primarily through rational argument that members of society form the mutual
understanding necessary to build the compromises needed to legitimize state enforcement of law. See
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 164-97 (Vol. 2, 1987).

167See Peters, supra note 166, at 104-11.

168See HABERMAS, DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW, supra note 164, at 426.

169See David Trubek, Complexity and Contradictionin the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge
of CriticalSocial Thought about Law, 11 L. Soc. REV. 529, 543 (1977).
170 Central to Habermas' theories is the belief that the legal norms of money and market power have
"uncoupled" the economic and political systems from the "lifeworld" of customs, society and personality.
The instrumental processes of modem industrial states have become so complex that they are no longer
integrated by the mechanisms of mutual understanding that binds the lifeworld. Law in Western societies,
it follows, performs the task of uncoupling state systems from the lifeworld.
171 See Nguyen Nham, Why Is the Management of the State by Law Still Weak? QUAN Doi NHAN
DAN, June 13, 1997 at 3.
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throughout the country."' 172 As the number of legislative instruments
proliferates and state authority is extended through administrative licenses
into every aspect of the economy, Habermas ' 173 concern that legal
processes are increasingly the preserve of technicians and the elite appears
less remote.
By focusing attention on the process of law formation, Habermas
demonstrates that legitimacy is not an all or nothing event. It is a nongeneralized phenomenon that waxes and wanes in rhythm to changes in
societal relations. Put another way, law is organized in respect of specific
events, and has no static immutable meaning, a view that is consistent with
the process orientation of Vietnamese law.174
While emphasizing different aspects of the legitimization process,
the above propositions revolve around the relationship between state
laws/apparatus and society. They accordingly plot the boundaries of state,
but not non-state legal subsystems. Unavoidably, this observation returns
the discussion to Tamanaha's problem with closure; there are no
methodologically consistent means of separating intertwined non-state
legal subsystems. 175 Pospisil, 176 for example, hypothesizes that such
groups inhabit "legal levels" that regulate themselves internally. He does
not, however, posit a method of determining where one legal level begins
and other ends. Moore's "semi-autonomous social fields" are defined in
turns of their ability to produce mutual obligations and the means of
enforcing or inducing compliance with group rules. 77 Semi-autonomous
social fields are self-legitimating and normatively distinct from other nonstate legal subsystems, and Moore is careful to stress their amorphous,
overlapping, and competing nature. Though suggestive as metaphors,
Moore's representation of the interconnections between state and non-state
legal systems lacks precision and the dynamism inferred by Haberman's
notion of communicative rationality. However, by delineating non-state
subgroups in terms of legal legitimacy, semi-autonomous social fields
differentiate between legal and merely social groupings. For this reason,
172

See VNA, SDTH NATIONALPARTY CONGRESS POLITICAL REPORT (Dec. 15, 1986) (on file with author).

173 See S.K. WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OFHABERMAS: REASONS, JUSICE & MODERNITY 116 (1988).

174See Adam Fforde, The Unimplementability of Policy and the Notion of Law in Vietnamese
Communist Thought, 1 SOUTHEAST ASIAN J. Soc. SC. 60, 66-68 (1986).
' See Masaji Chiba, Japan, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 87-88 (1997) (stating that there are no fully
operational cross-cultural definitions of law); Peter Fitzpatrick Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.
J. 115, 128 (1984) (stating there are unbridgeable gaps between law and other social forns).
176See LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 107-25 (1971).
177See Moore, supra note 122, at 22-23.
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Moore' architecture of legal pluralism is applied to the following case
studies to ascertain whether local land practices are sufficiently
autonomous to constitute non-state legal sub-systems.
IV.

CASE STUDIES CONCERNING THE LEGALIZATION OF LAND USE RIGHTS

A.

State Recognition of Land Use Rights

After decades of revolution and civil war in Vietnam, one of the most
urgent and sensitive issues facing state land management is the orderly
recognition of ancien regime land rights. This problem is particularly acute
in Ho Chi Minh City. The overwhelming majority of the population hold
178
titles issued or approved by the former Republic of Vietnam ("RV").
These titles must be converted to land use rights issued by the City People's
Committee 79before residents can lawfully transfer, mortgage, and bequeath
their land. 1
There are two methods of converting ancien regime rights into legally
recognized land use rights (quyen su dung dat). The first is available to those
possessing documents attesting to ownership or rights of occupancy.' 8 0
These include titles issued by the DRV, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam,' 8 ' and in some circumstances the ancien regime. Pre-1975
documentation is only recognized where ownership claims are undisputed and
the property in question has not been re-allocated for other uses after
reunification. This commonly occurred where occupants were deemed
8 2
politically hostile ("capitalist landlords"), or occupied large land holdings.'
Title conversion is also available, but seldom granted to those who lawfully
left Vietnam between August 6, 1984, and April 25, 1989.18 Adding to the
"8 See Van Hai, Nha Dat Gia Binh Dam [Cheap Price for Land], SAi GON GIAI PHONG, Aug.
31, 1996, at 11.
19 Decree 61 CP on Dwelling House Purchase, Sale and Business, art. 3 (July 5, 1994) (on file
with author).
so Decree No. 60-CP On Ownership of Residential Housing and Land Use Rights in Urban Areas
art.7 (July 5, 1994) (on file with author).
...
Id. art. 10; General Department of Land Administration("GDLA"), Official Letter No 647 CV/DV
(May 31, 1995).
182Decree No. 60 CP on Ownership of Residential Housing and Right to Use Land in Urban Areas
art. 10(2) (July 5, 1994) (on file with author); Tuan Minh, Contractual Dispute at House No. 33/14,
DistrictNo. 10 Phu Nhuan Precinct,TROI TRE [YOUTH], June 29, 1996, at 1, 3.
183See Henry Gallagher, Decision No. 1488: Deed-holders for Overseas Vietnamese, 4 ViETNAm
Bus. J. 30, 30-31 (1994).
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complexities besetting document verification, many occupants derive
possession through a chain of transfers from the original titleholder. Any
break or defect in the chain blocks, without necessarily invalidating, the right
to occupation.184
The second, and most common path to converting ancien regime land
rights occurs where there is an incurable break in the chain of land
documents, or where documents were lost or never existed. In these
circumstances phuong/xa'8 5 and Fatherland Front officials 8 6 must certify
uninterrupted occupation since December 18, 1980.187 Frequent personal
changes at this level, combined with poorly maintained residency records
makes this an especially difficult process.
Informants claim that both methods of legalization are virtually
unworkable.18 8 A comparison of the number of land use right certificates
issued in Ho Chi Minh City (36.7 percent) 8 9 and Hanoi (six percent)190
suggests that the legalization process is comparatively more successful in the
South then in the North. Some central officials, however, attribute the
discrepancy to higher levels of procedural non-conformity in Ho Chi Minh
City.' 9' In both cities, a twenty percent tax on land transfers, 192 the high cost
of verifying cadastral boundaries, 193 and administrative penalties levied on
past unlawful land transfers' 94 discourage conversion applications.
"" Defects in the chain of titles can generally be legalized by payment of an administrative fine. See
Instruction No. 1427 CV/DC on the Settlement of Some Problems Regarding Land for the Issuance of
Certificates of Land Use Rights art. 3 (Oct. 13, 1995) (on file with author).
185 The level of state administration below village/district authorities.
186 The Fatherland Front is the peak umbrella organization for mass organizations.
Although it
stands apart from the Communist Party of Vietnam, it is still controlled by that party.
'i This date is important because it marks the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, which
extinguished private land ownership. Decree No. 60-CP art. 10 (3) (1994) (on file with author). Official
Dispatch Providing Guidelines on the Resolution of Outstanding Matters Regarding the Issuance of
Housing Ownership Certificates and Residential Land Ownership Certificates (Dec. 11, 1997 Ho Chi
Minh People's Committee) (no ownership certificates issues to those without ho khan [household
registration]). See generally Interview with Mai Xuan Yen, Chief Inspector for the Land Administration
Department, in Hanoi (Oct. 27, 1997) [hereinafter MAI XUAN YEN INTERVIEW].
185 These observations are based on numerous interviews, conducted with Vietnamese Government
Officials, private, lawyers, and representative land occupiers in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
between 1992 and 1996.
...In 1995, although 92.4% of land in Ho Chi Minh City was mapped in cadastral surveys, only
36.7% of premises held land use right certificates. See The Gia, supra note 8, at 3.
'90 In 1996, although approximately 80 percent of land in Hanoi was mapped in cadastral surveys, only
about 6 percent of premises held lands use right certificates. MAI XuAN YEN INTERVIEW, supranote 187.
191 Id.
12

Law Governing Taxes on Land Use Right Assignment art. 7 (1994).

193 It is estimated that issuance of the 15 million land use certificates needed to cover the country, 100,000

cadastral maps will be required, based on 75,000 aerial photographs See GLAD AND THE WEsTERN
AuSTAuAN GovERNMENT, FINAL FEAsmtuT SmY LAND ADMINIsTRATIVE REFoRM at 9 (March 1995).
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Official reports have identified 1,345 annual cases of wrongful or
inappropriate land use allotment in Ho Chi Minh City during 1996, but
concedes this figure represents "the tip of an iceberg."1 95 Others estimate that
less then ten percent of tens of thousands of land allotment applications
processed annually conform to statutory requirements.1 96 Still others place
the level of illegal land allotment closer to eighty percent. 197 Whatever the
precise figures, where compliance is a fiinge phenomena, explanations for
non-compliance must look beyond ad hoc or random malfeasance. The
question remains whether the interface between local officials and the public
constitutes a non-state legal subsystem.
B.

Explanationsfor Non-Compliance

1.

Localism (DiaPhuong Chu Nhia)

Some local officials believe that central authorities are excessively
hostile to all things connected with the former Republic of Vietnam. They
also say that central policies transplanted from their origins in the North to
Ho Chi Minh City, lose much of their ideological relevance and legitimacy. 198
In other words, many officials believe that the state bears primary
responsibility for the chaotic land tenure system. 199 As previously discussed,
housing allocation before the Land Law of 1988 and especially the Law on
Land of 1993 was fragmented and politically based. Residency records were

Even urban areas lack cadastral maps. In Hanoi, for example, only 22 out of 84 sub-districts (phuongs) are
adequately surveyed. See M Loan, FurtherStrengthening Land Management in the Municipality,HANOI Moi
[NEW HANOI], F.B.I.S. E. ASIADAiLY REP. 96-075 at 98, 100 (Feb. 27, 1996).

194Instruction No. 1427 CP/DC on the Settlement of Some Problems Regarding Land for the
Issuance of Certificates of Land Use Right art. IV (2) (Oct. 13, 1995) (on file with author); Decree No. 4CP on Sanctions Against Administrative Violations in the Domain of Land Management and Use (Jan.
10, 1997) (on file with author).
'95 Minh Tam, Legal Documents on Housing and Land are Too Numerous, Backward But They Still
Remain, VIETNAMEco. DEV. REV., Jan. 1, 1997, at 1-3.
'96 See The Gia, supra note 8,at 3;NGUYEN KHAI INTERVIEW, supra note 113.
'9'Interview with Do Duc Dinh, Director Institute of World Economy, in Hanoi (Dec. 26, 1996).
198 A similar mismatch arose when the North attempted to impose its model of rural collectivization

on the South shortly after reunification. Facing local resistance and declining crop yields the project was
eventually abandoned. See Vo-Tong Xuan, Rice Production, Agricultural Research, and the
Environment, in VIETNAM'S RuRAL TRANSFORMATION 186-88 (1995). Others point to a much more deep

seated historical Northern bias. See WOODSIDE, supranote 30, at 139.
'99See Tran Le, Land Planning Gone Wrong, VIETNAM COURIER, May 11, 1997 at 5, 10;Tntong
Lai, Urban Governance From a SociologicalApproach, 4 VIETNAM SoC. Sa. 22-24 (1996).
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poorly maintained and authorities tacitly accepted illegal land and house
transfers. 2°
Since the enactment of the Law on Land of 1993, officials are expected
to bring order to urban development. However, faced with dysfunctional
central rules and a community that does not clearly differentiate between
public and private behavior, they risk loosing local trust and cooperation if
their decisions are strictly based on rules and procedures. Land management
consequentially requires luat mem ("flexible law") and co long tot voi dan
("showing good heart to the people"). In practice this often means bending
central rules to enable family, patrons, and members of the local community
to legalize ancien regime titles.
Press reports suggest that local officials legitimize otherwise illegal
land transfers by accepting certificates verifying continuous occupancy,
knowing that they were secured through bribes. 20 1 Alternatively, local
officials collude in schemes that exploit legal uncertainties. For example,
vendors can legalize unregistered land by entering loan agreements with
purchasers to finance the construction of a house. In return for extinguishing
the loan, vendors transfer the house to the purchaser, and officials grant a
land use right to the substratum.202
2.

Legislative andProceduralComplexities

Another explanation for non-compliance are complex procedures and
under-resourced and overworked staff.20 3 Applications for house ownership
certificates and land use rights, for example, are supposed to follow four
procedural steps taking no longer then sixty days to complete. 20 4 In practice,
applicants must negotiate numerous ancillary procedures, often taking six or
more months. In one instance, an application lodged in Ho Chi Minh City

200 See MIGRATION, HUMAN RESOURCES,

EMPLOYMENT AND URBANIZATION

IN Ho CHI MINH

CITY 28 (1996).
201 See Van Hai, N/ha Dat Gia Binh Dan, [Land and House at Low Price], SAI GON TIEP CHI, Aug.
31, 1996 at 11.
202 House Ownership Certificates are now issued on Land Use Right Certificates. See Le Uy Linh,
Dat Binh Phu (Q. 6) Dang Tang Gia? [Binh Phu's Land Price on the Rise?], Sm GON TIEP CI, Oct. 26,
1996 at 12.
203 See Tmong Lai, supra note 199, at 22-24.
204 Decree

on Ownership of Residential Housing and Right to Use Land in Urban Areas, No. 60 CP

art 14 (July 5, 1994) (on file with author).
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during December
1987 was trapped in a maze of bureaucratic infighting for
20 5
over ten years.
Legislation is vague and frequently contradictory. For example, many
of the sixteen types of documents 20 6 deemed capable of being legalized into
land use rights do not exist.20 7 Although the Law on the Promulgation of
Legal Documents of 1996 was supposed to- have authoritatively resolved

lingering uncertainty concerning the hierarchical status of legislative
instruments, 20 8 officials in Ho Chi Minh City, but apparently not Hanoi,
continue to treat circular letters issued by the General Land Department as
advisory rather than mandatory. 20 9 More generally, drafting and procedural

discrepancies were found in 170 out of 396 land administration documents
during a recent survey in Ho Chi Minh City.2 0 Uncertainty leads to
conflicting interpretations, even within the same land administration
departments. 211 Moreover, notaries are reluctant to certify land documents
they cannot understand or verify. 212
3.

Corruption

213
Corruption is also blamed for non-compliant land title conversions.
According to party and state accounts, an incomplete regulatory system, poor
central supervision, lack of appropriate training, and working conditions are

205

See L.T.O., Muoi Nam Cho Mot Giay Chu Quyen [Ten Years for a Land Certificatel, SAi GON

GAI PHONG, Jan. 1, 1997 at 3 (reporting that residents were relocated after fire destroyed two hundred
houses in District Five, but after agreeing to issue land use certificates, officials disagreed whether the
level of compensation is appropriate); Minh Tam, Legal Documents on Housing and Land are Too
Numerous, Backwards But They Still Remain, Eco. DEV. REV., Jan. 1, 1997.
206 Accepted documents are listed in Official Letter No. 647, supra note 181.
207 Interview with Housing and Land Department Officials on the Hanoi
Peoples' Committee, in
Hanoi (Oct. and Nov. 1997).
208 Law on the Promulgation of Legal Documents art. 58(3) (1996) (on file with author) (defining
the term "guide the implementation" to be considered mandatory by central level officials but advisory by
local officials).
209MAI XUAN YEN INTERVIEW, supra note 187.
210 See Bao Tram, Phap Luat Ve Dat Dai: Cuon Chi Can Go Roi [Law on Land; A Coil of Thread
to
be Rearranged],PHAP LUAT, July 1, 1997, at 6-7.
211 See Nguyen Hoai Nam, Some Comments on Different Interpretationsfor Some Articles of the
Land Law, 7 NHANuoc VAPHAP LUAT [STATE AND LAW] 15-20 (May 1996).
212Minh Tam, supra note 195.
213See, e.g., The Gia, supra note 8, at 3; Nhi Thanh, Kiet Xu So Tham Va An Tham o Tai San Xiton
a Phuong Le Loc, Thanh Pho Vinh [First Instance Resolution of the Case of Socialist Property
Embezzlement ofLe Loi Phuong, Vinh City], NHAN DAN [THE PEOPLE], Oct. 15, 1995, at 1.
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the underlying causes of malfeasance.214 Other officials believe that
corruption is tied to declining moral standards more so than imperfect legal
structures.215 Some point to market reforms and individualism. Whatever the
underlying causes, central authorities rarely acknowledge that malfeasance
flourishes in the regulatory gap between the unifying aspirations of central
land law and local conditions.
The 1986 Penal Code crimnalizes bribery, which involves the misuse
of public power for private advantage.2 16 However, local prosecutors,
sympathetic to the pragmatic motives of land officials, overlook behavior
considered criminal by central level cadre.217 Despite tens of thousands of
technically illegal land conversions in Ho Chi Minh City each year, the author
is unaware of a single incidence where a local official has been prosecuted.
There are of course numerous prosecutions for embezzlement of state
property. It is unclear whether inaction implies tacit approval by city level
people's committee officials, or that removal of all offenders is impossible, or
that there are simply too many incidents. If senior officials were serious
about curbing procedural irregularities, they could follow the usual practice of
making an example of prominent offenders. This has not happened.
Administrative Discretionor Spheres ofNon-State Law

4.

The question remains whether wide spread collusion between local
land officials and the public constitutes a non-state legal subsystem. Since
land legalization processes are prescribed by law, if non-state law exists, it
must inform the discretionary authority assumed by local officials. Whether
assumed discretion constitutes semi-autonomous social fields depends on the
214

See Nguyen Xuan Yem & Doan Kinh, Offences of Bribery and Some Social Preventive

Measures, 4 NHA Nuoc VA PHA? LUAT [STATE AND LAW] 20, 21-22 (1995); Thanh Tam, Vietnam: Do
Muoi Interviewed on Anticorrupton Work, SIAGON GiAI PHONG, Nov. 5, 1996, at 1, 5.
215 See Phong Lan, Carry on the Anti-corruption Struggle: New Requirements, Strong Measures,
PHONG, Apr. 2, 1994, at 2 ; Editorial, Endeavors to Revamp the Party must be Closely
Linked with Efforts to Fight Corruption,NHAN DAN [THE PEOPLE], July 1, 1994, at 1, 3.
216 PENAL CODE, art. 226 (bribery) and arts. 211-221 (abuse of official power) (1986). Until recent
amendments to the PENAL CODE of 1986 expanded the definition of malfeasance to include acts committed
SAIGON Gi4I

"for other personal motives," abuse of power (including ultra vires acts) without personal gain escaped the
criminal justice system. LAW ON AMENDMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS TO A NUMBER OF ARTICLES OF THE
PENAL CODE, arts. 6, 7 (1997).

217Malfeasance is only criminal where it constitutes a "social danger," a nebulous concept that
roughly equates to an infringement of the public interest. PENAL CODE art. 8 (1986) (stating that social
danger constitutes an infringement of the independence and sovereign integrity of the nation; the socialist
state; or fundamental rights of citizens ). Interviews with Pham Hong Hai, Director of Criminology,
Institute of State and Law, in Hanoi (Jan. 8, 9 1997).
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Archetypal Weberian
assumptions concerning official decision-making.
bureaucracies have no need for assumed discretion, because procedural
functions are prescribed by written rules.218
In reality, however,
organizations do not function like machines. 219 Written rules cannot cover
every contingency.
Decision-making at the local level is not well researched. Claims by
some Ho Chi Minh City Peoples Committee officials that their decisions are
primarily based on rules, policy, and procedures, are not supported by
informants, nor are they plausible. It is known, however, that in Vietnam's
communitarian society discretion is a collective undertaking. Informants
describe land allotment process where approval for title conversion is rarely
given without interdepartmental consultation. 220 For example, applications to
convert ancien regime titles are routinely resolved by consensual
determinations of housing and land, and cadastral departments. Where no
title exists, occupancy claims are verified by committees comprised of
personnel drawn from phuong (and sometimes ton) level people's
committees, Fatherland Front organisations, police and party branches.
Decisions are presented as unanimous outcomes. Since consensus relies on
strong personal interaction, local cultural factors like status, experience,
education, familial and patron-client relationships compete with external
policy and rules. In short, local norms and practices inform all official
decisions, blurring boundaries between public and private responsibilities.
Distinctions based on state and non-state legal subsystems are difficult
to substantiate where it is unclear whether the role of the state is to manage
society according to immutable ideals, or whether that role is to support the
public by adjusting policies to reinforce observed practice on the ground.22'
When reconfigured in this organizational context, procedural non-compliance
218

See Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-244 (H.H.

Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
219 This is a highly controversial area of legal discourse. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976); cf D.GALLIGAN DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL
DISCRETION 167 (1988).
220 The following comments are based on interviews with officials from the Chief Architects Offices
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City during November 1995 and November/December 1997; and Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh City Housing and Land Departments December and October/ November 1997. See Anh
Khue, Thay Gi Qua Cia Cach Hanh Chanh 0 Nganh Dia Chinh [Comments on Administrative Reform by
the Land Administration Office], SAl GON GIA PHONG, May 1, 1997, at 2.
221 Central laws enforced according to the policy of Nha Nuoc Phap Queyen [literally,
rule by law
or, state legal rights], are construed at the local level as ultimately unattainable ideals, rather then
absolutes that must be obeyed. See Nguyen Nham, Why is the Management of the State by Law Still
Weak?, QuAN DoI NHAN DAN, June 13, 1997, at 3.
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in Ho Chi Minh City is consistent with officials diligently reconciling
dysfunctional central rules with an urgent local demand for secure land titles.
Even the terminology used by officials to describe discretionary processes is
infused with subjectivity. One commonly used term for discretion (niem tin
noi tam) literally means "believe in one self' or "was the decision made with
the heart" (tam).
The distribution and arrogation of power between central policymakers, and city and districtlphuong officials, not only suggests polycentric
land management, but also de facto federalism. Though sometimes pursuing
local agendas that conflict with central postulates, there is little in the
preceding case study to infer the high level of social cohesion needed for the
interaction between local authorities and land use right applicants to
constitute a semi-autonomous social field-non-legal subsystem. The official
and unofficial aspects of the registration process are better understood as two
components of the same system. It suits all levels of government to sanction
a degree of unofficial activity, since this invests authorities with a broad
administrative control over areas that are technically outside the legal
framework.2 22
C.

Squatter Settlements

1.

Non-state Land Transactions

The sense of community associated with squatting implies mutual
obligations and norms, a precondition of non-state legal subsystems.
Overcoming strict residency restrictions, the search for work and lure of
urban life proves irresistible to rural migrants. 223 Together with the urban
poor, they have built makeshift accommodations along the waterways and
city fringe of Ho Chi Minh City and the banks of the Red River in Hanoi. 224
Once regarded as a state responsibility, 225 the allocation of residential housing
222 Extensive power is given to local authorities to control the lives of citizens through complex
administrative regulations that cover most aspects of human activity. See Decree No. 4-CP on Sanctions

Against Administrative Violations in the Domain of Land Management and Use, No. 4-CP (Jan. 10,

1997) (on file with author)
223 See IPS, Vietnam: No Place For Unskilled Rural Migrants, INTERNET VNB NEWS, Jan. 30, 1997.

224Newspaper reports place unlawful housing construction in Ho Chi Minh City at 50% in general
and rising to 90% in District No. 4. See Le Uy Linh, Vi Phan, Xay Dung-Can Benh Man Tinh? [Illegal
Construction - Chronic Disease?], SAIGON TIEP THI [SAIGON CONSUMER], June 7, 1997, at 8 ; Trinh Duy

Luon & Nguyen Quong Vinh, supra note 8, at 21-25.
225 The Ho Chi Minh City Master Plan promulgated by the Prime Minister in January 1993
establishes the location of different land uses. See Nguyen Quang Vinh, Socio-Economic and Spatial
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is now almost entirely reliant on market forces. Sharply reduced state
housing subsidies, the commodification of residential land, and an acute
housing shortage, have all increased residential costs beyond the means of
low-income groups.226 Rapidly increasing urban squatting is the predictable
consequence. 227 Approximately seven percent of the population of Ho Chi

Minh City lives in squatter settlements primarily constructed on public
land.228
Of all the different manifestations of urban land use, squatting has the
most ambiguous social and legal status. In each of its guises squatting exists
outside the orbit of state law. 229 The regularization of long term occupation is
hindered by statutory provisions 230 that restrict title conversion to areas zoned
residential in Urban Master Plans. 231 Since most squatting takes place on
public land, watercourses, road verges, parks and state owned enterprise
land, legalization is generally not a possibility. Even where it is, a tax
amounting to twenty percent of land valuation is levied on land occupied
since 1980. This rate rises to one hundred percent after 1993.232
The state's reluctance to regularize squatting contrasts with broad
community support for those who, over a long period of use, have come to
rely on the shelter provided by land. Both the Le and Nguyen legal codes
protected adverse possession after a period of twenty to thirty years, a
principle that subsequently entered popular customary practice.233 Though

Aspects of the UrbanizationProcess in Ho Chi Minh City, in PLANNING AND GOVERNANCE OF THE ASIAN
METRoPous 226-27 (Basil van Horen & Aprodicio A. Laquian eds., 1995); Trinh Duy Luon and Nguyen
Quong Vinh supra note 8, at 27-29.
226 See Vietnam: No Place For Unskilled Rural Migrants in the Cities, supra, note 223; D. Forbes.
The Urban Network and Economic Reform in Vietnam, 27 ENVIRONMENT & PLANNING 793, 805 (1995).
227 See Trinh Duy Luan, Nhung Chieu Canh Kinh Te-Xa Hoi Trong Su Tien Hoa Cua Mo Hinh Nha
0 Do Thi Ha Noi [Social and Economic Featuresof ResidentialModels in Hanoi], 1 XA HoI HoC [1 Soc.
REV.] 1996).
222 See Nguyen Quang Vinh & Michael Leaf, City Life in the Village of Ghosts: a Case Study of
PopularHousing in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 20 HABITAT INT'L 2, 175-76 (1996).
229 Much of the commentary on squatting based on a series of interviews with city and district level
officials in the Housing and Land Departments of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Peoples' Committees
during January, October, and November 1997.
230 Decree No. 60 CP art. 10 (July 5 1994) (on file with author).
231 See Quy HOACH CAC Do THI VIET NAM VA NHUNG Du AN PHAT TRIEN DEN SAu NAM 2000
[IASTER PLAN OF URBAN AREAS IN VIETNAM AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO THE YEARS AFTER 2000] 9,
15-16 (Nguyen Tien Duy ed., 1997).
232 See Decree No. 45-CP Supplementing Article 10 of Decree No. 60 (July 1994) of the
Government on Dwelling House Ownership and Residential Land Use Right in Urban Areas art. 1 (Aug.
3, 1996) (on file .with author).
233 MAI XUAN YEN INTERVIEW, supra note 187.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 7 No. 3

adverse possession of state land appears to encourage appropriation, it also
promotes the effective use and development of valuable resources.
Squatters have created their own elaborate self-legitimizing processes
to formalize otherwise illegal land transactions. For over a generation,
squatters inHo Chi Minh City have used hand written documents to evidence
land transfers and bequests, duplicating the legitimizing mantel of land use
rights.234 More formalized de facto land tenure systems have evolved in
settlements adjoining the Red River in Hanoi. 235 Here, occupants certify
photocopies of official pro-forma certificates of land use and house ownership
documents with official looking seals.236 In' other cases, respected third
parties both witness and certify transactions. Since purchasers are evidently
well aware documents are not "official," rather than deception, their function
is apparently to dignify illegal transactions with the trappings of
respectability. Squatters treat occasional fines and bribes as affordable
penalties or negative licenses, 237 while threats to demolish unlawfully
constructed houses are disregarded in the face of official inaction.238
When required by local officials to move, squatters frequently evoke
the 1980 Constitution which guarantees "citizens a right to housing. '239 Both
the public and local officials have been slow to internalize the new housing
policy based on self-help enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. 240 Socialized by
the belief that with responsibility comes an obligation to support and protect,
officials are acutely aware that strict legal enforcement of land law inevitably
leads to homelessness. They are particularly reluctant to act where, by
transgressing community mores, their families experience social ostracism.
Relocation of squatters is, moreover, a financial drain on local resources
except where the central state provides specific budgetary outlays for this
purpose.
234See Nguyen & Lief, supra note 228, at 183-84: Van Hai, Nha Dat Gia Binh Dam [Cheap Prices
for Land andHousing], SAI GON GIAI PHONG, Aug. 31, 1996, at 11.
235 Interviews with Nguyen Ngoc Khoi, Director, National Institute of Urban and Regional Planning
in Hanoi (Feb. 3, 1994 and Sept. 13,1994); Interviews with Nguyen Lan, Chief Architect, Hanoi People's
Committee in Hanoi (July 1, 1994 and Dec. 20, 1996).
236The author has personally sighted these documents.
237

See Hai Thanh, Rampant Illegal Construction Turning West Lake Suburbs in to Chaotic Sprawl,

VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Nov. 8, 1993 at 24; Nguyen Tri Dung, Construction Procedures: A Blue
Printfor Chaos, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., May 23,1994, at 16; L.U.L., Lien Mung Cat Aha va Chia
Phat [Illegal Construction and Fines], SAIGON TIEP CHI, Dec. 21, 1996, at 6.
238See L.U.L., Quy Cu Quy, Mua Van Cu Mua [Land Transactions Continued Despite the Zoning
Plan], SAIGON TIEPTHI [SAIGON CONSUMER], Dec. 7, 1996, at 6.

239CONST. art. 62 (1980). (The state assumed responsibility for providing housing).
240 CONST. art. 62 (1992). (Citizens have a right to build their own housing).
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Though genuine need remains the primary cause of squatting, a
romantic attachment to the dispossessed, should not obscure underlying
motives of commercial opportunism. For example, many of those purchasing
houses illegally constructed along watercourses or on flood planes are
attracted by low market prices. 241 Further, state compensation motivates
opportunistic construction on land reserved for new roads and foreign
242
investment projects.
2.

State Involvement in Squatter Settlements

Contrary to the popular prejudice that blames squatters for disease and
crime, squatter communities are in most respects law abiding. Even the most
flagrant violators of zoning 243 and property 244 laws must contend with an
authoritarian government. When peeled away, the external appearance of
legal autonomy reveals complex legal and extralegal relationships between
squatters and the state. For example, a recent study of Xom Ma squatter
settlement in Ho Chi Minh City discovered informal officially sanctioned
street committees (To Dan Pho) cooperating with the local district peoples'
committee to plant trees, supply electricity and water, and advance low
interest loans. 245 As unauthorized rural migrants or displaced urban poor,
most squatter households are only entitled to register with the police as
temporary residents, a status that in theory denies access to state services
such as housing credit, health care and education.246 In practice, sympathetic
with the people" (co long tot voi
local officials demonstrate their "good heart
247
dan) by granting access to social services.
Conditions vary among localities, but most squatters enjoy regular or
irregular employment, participation rates are comparable to those of Ho Chi

241 See Van Hal, supra note 234, at 11.
242 Interview with Ha Van Que, Assistant to the Chief Architect,

in Hanoi (Nov. 10,1997)

[hereinafter HA VAN QuE INTERVIEW].
243 Law on Land arts. 18,19 (1993).
244Id. arts.
20, 23(3)(d).
245See Nguyen & Lief, supra note 228, at 185; M. Hosaka, Sharing Local Development Experiences
Transnationally: Networking in Support of Community and Local Initiatives, 5 ENV'T URBANIZATION 132
(1993) (discusses government assistance in Hiep Thanh squatter settlement HCMC).
246Decree on Household Registration and Management, No. 51-CP, arts. 11, 12 (May 10, 1997) (on

file with author). Permanent registration is only open to those possessing a certificate of "Lawful
Dwelling-House." These are only issued to lawful house owners/tenants and their guests.

247 See Le Van Nam, Urban Housing in the Implementation of Ho Chi Minh City Master Plan 3 XA

Hot Hoc [3 Soc. REV.] 32, 32-35 (1993); Nguyen & Lief, supra note 228, at 184-86.
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Minh City as a whole.248 High housing costs have made squatting an
attractive alternative to the legal housing market for young families and even
some professionals. The report also indicated that members of the squatter
settlement belonged to political organizations, including the party and other
Fatherland Front organizations.
3.

Legal Pluralism or ToleratedIllegality?

The self-enforcing land rights and obligations found in some squatter
settlements resemble the semi-autonomous social fields of non-state legal
subsystems. However, even these apparently self-contained communities resist
the template of legal pluralism.
Far from perceiving themselves as a semi-autonomous sub-group,
squatters generally regard unofficial occupation as a temporary transition to
legality. Indeed, in most respects squatters are indistinguishable from their land
owning neighbors. Apart from norms of tmst and moral reciprocity common to
society as a whole, interviews with squatters reveal no group-based legal
postulates or enforcement practices capable of justifying a legally distinct, nonstate subsystem. 249 The formalization of land transactions was primarily
motivated by thoughts of eventual conversion to legal titles rather than furnishing
evidence for community based enforcement. Coercion generally relied on highly
contextualized family and/or patron-client networks, which lacked the cohesion
of semi-autonomous social fields.
One of the most perplexing aspects of the legal pluralist model is knowing
when interaction between subsystems breaks down the notional boundaries
surrounding semi-autonomous social fields. This issue is particularly relevant to
squatting, since this phenomena cannot exist without the support, or at least the
forbearance of local officials. As previously noted, community services and
social cohesion is maintained through organizations like street committees, which
negotiate and cooperate with local officials. The boundaries surrounding squatter
subsystems would need to be extremely porous to account for integration with
the state system.250 Even the most spontaneous forms of squatting are shaped
and reliant upon the very rules they flout.
248

Fifty seven percent of squatters are regularly employed.

Twenty-five percent are irregularly

employed. See Nguyen & Lief, supra note 228, at 181.
249 See HOANG Noc HIEN INTERVIEW, supra note 3 1.
m Though it is possible that the squatter subsystem includes local, but not central level officials, this

argument does not account for the polycentric power structures in Vietnam. Although, sometimes
pursuing conflicting agendas, both central and local authorities claim membership in the state legal
subsystem.
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Lacking cohesive policies and laws concerning the treatment of squatters,
local officials use their discretionary power to subtly combine official and
unofficial law to further local imperatives. This blending of norms is evident in
the innovative use of customary, adverse possession rights to convert over time
temporary unofficial occupancy into permanent official occupancy. If, as this
suggests, legal legitimacy is an ongoing process, rather than a binary legal/illegal
event, then non-compliance with central land laws neither signifies illegality or
membership of a non-state legal subsystem. After all, fine distinctions between
state and non-state legal subsystems are difficult to sustain where the bulk of the
population, including the urban elite, indulge in some form of unofficial land use.
Competing visions for urban space revolve around those who argue on
moral grounds that rules should be flexibly applied (luat mem) to squatters and
those who champion aspirations for an orderly, nile based (luat cung) modem
city. 25 1 This debate is sometimes located in the struggle between the
"supervillage" (sieu lang) customs binding local officials and squatters, and
modem rational laws representing the development objectives of the elite.252 As
the French discovered over a century ago, impersonal laws have few points of
intersection with a society composed of individuals linked by highly fluid and
contextualized familial and political/business networks. Although neo-Confucian
moral values have been unraveling for at least a century, family centered moral
25 3
influence continues to reinforce and stabilize most human interaction.
Unaccustomed to legal mechanisms controlling land use, instrumental laws and
institutions appear uncontrollable to some, possessing the ability to disrupt daily
lives. Others, who are frequently elites, invest laws with the ability to excite
urban modernization (hien dai hoa). This interaction between legal control
(phap tri) and personal control (duc tri) is poorly researched, but in it are
glimpses of a more textured understanding of the relationship between willful
civil disobedience and identification with non-state subsystems.
252For example, at the same time that City government lacks resources to deal with squatters, and

when it cannot control residential construction, the government plans a "21st century cybercity." See
Housing Program Needs Much Support, VIETNAM NEWS, Sept. 11, 1994, at 2; Lee Yan Kuen, Illegal
BuildingMeans DangerousHouses, VIETNAM NEWS, Nov. 4, 1997, at 2; Tuan Ho, HCM City Wants to be

21st Century Cybercity, VIETNAM NEWS, Nov. 5, 1997, at 3.
252The term "supervillage" refers to the infiltration of hu tuc [degenerated customs] from villages
into all streams of Vietnamese society. Approximately half of the population of Ho Chi Minh City came
from rural areas. See INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH FOR Ho CHI MIN CITY, MIGRATION, HUMAN
RESOURCES, AND URBANIZATION IN Ho CHI MINH CITY § 2.3, at 37 (1996). On the question of the
supervillage, see Hoang Ngoc Hien, The Strength of Culture and the Development of Civilization, 4
VIETNAM SOCIAL SCIENCES 54, 64-67 (1996).

253See Ngo Ba Thanh, Vietnam's Integration into a New Humanist InternationalLegal Order, 2

VIETNAM L. & LEGAL FORUM 26 (1995).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

V.

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND

A.

Appropriationfor Public Purposes

VOL. 7 No. 3

The Law on Land of 1993254 gives the state power to compulsorily
acquire land, subject to payment of compensation. 25 Like taking of private
property laws in Western countries, 2 56 compensation in Vietnam is only available
to those possessing, or legally entitled to land use rights.2s7 This reliance on
legalism generates problems where only a third of all occupants (excluding

tenants) in Ho Chi Minh City, and fewer in other urban centers, hold valid land
use certificates. The problem is compounded on the city fringe of Hanoi, where
local authorities have deliberately refrained from issuing land use certificates over
rural land in the hope of attracting major investment to unoccupied land.258
Villagers living in Tho Da village, on the outskirts of Hanoi, for example,
opposed the compulsory acquisition of ninety-three hectares of land by the
Daewoo corporation for the construction of a golf course. Lacking land use
rights, some villages resorted to violence to press claims for compensation denied
under Decree 90 CP 1994.259 A few have been jailed for opposing police
evictions. 260
1.

The Adequacy of Compensation

Even where occupiers hold land use right certificates, compensation for
compulsory acquisition is frequently below market values. Legislation
provides for either the replacement of compulsorily acquired land with
allotments of similar area and standard, or an equivalent level of monetary
reparation. 261 Payments are calculated on the basis of a standard formula
based on factors like location and building quality. Though periodically
Law on Land art. 27 (1993).
Decree Promulgating Regulations on Compensation Upon State Recovery of Land for the Purpose
of National Defense, Security, National Interests, Public Interest, No. 90-CP, arts. 6-10 (Aug. 17, 1994)
(on file with author).
256 See for example the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. See
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.L. REV. 1165 (1967).
257 Decree Promulgating Regulations on Compensation Upon State Recovery
of Land for the Purpose
of National Defense, Security, National Interests, Public Interest, No. 90- CP, art. 2 (Aug. 17, 1994).
258 See Cong Thanh, Land CertificatesMisused, Delayed, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., May 1, 1995, at 3.
259 See Peter Mares, Viet Golf (Radio Australia Broadcasting radio broadcast, Dec. 31, 1996).
260 See, Vietnam Jails Golf Course Protesters,Reuters, Nov. 8, 1996.
261 Decree Promulgating Regulations on Compensation, No. 90 CP, art 6-10 (Aug. 17,1994) (on file
with author).
214

255
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revised, intense competition for housing has stimulated rapid price rises that
have out stripped compensation levels. Commentators report that it is almost
impossible to purchase properties of similar quality in equivalent locations
with prescribed payments.262
The problem is illustrated by protests demanding adequate
compensation for land appropriated for the constructing of a foreign funded
trunk road from Ho Chi Minh City to its southern satellite town.26 3
Negotiated payments amounted to less than a quarter of market value,
representing a loss of approximately one hundred million Vietnamese dong
(about USD $9,000) per person. Adding to the general sense of injustice,
"surplus land" was resold by the road construction company at a substantial
profit.
As one commentator put it, "the foremost purpose of the
implementation of the Law of Foreign Investment was to serve the common
goals of the state and people. The bitter thing here is that the honest peasant
with muddy feet and hands were the first to suffer." 264 Authorities believe
that open-ended compensation scales encourage occupants to delay projects
to increase payments.26 5
2.

CompensatingPossessoryInterests

World Bank funded projects have avoided protests effecting road
widening projects elsewhere in Vietnam, by requiring provincial authorities to
compensate all occupants displaced by road works at market rates. 266 The
Bank's Operational Manual states that compensation shall be paid to those
"who may have customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the
project. The absence of legal title to land by such groups should not be a bar
to compensation. ,267 Bank projects recognize two sources of legal
occupation:
land use rights and temporary written permission from

262

See Duong Thanh, What's It Worth? Land Compensation Disputes Can Stir Up Local Passions,

VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, June 1997, at 24; T.B.L, Administrative Reform, Shortcomings, Resolutions,
SAIGON GIAi PHONG [SAIGON LIBERATION], Jan. 13,1996, at 1, 5; Hoang Phuong, Tai Sao Nguoi Nong
Chiu Thiet, [Why Do FarmersSuffer Losses?], TuOl THI [YouTH], July 18, 1996, at 3.
263 See Le Cong Son Tram Dan Do Dan [Road Widening Dispute], THANH NIEN [YOUNG], Mar. 1,
1997, at 9, 15.
264 See Huang Phuong, Tai Sao Ba Con Nong Dan Phai Chieu Thiet?, THANH NIEN [YOUNG], July
18, 1996, at 8.
265See Duong Thanh, supra note 262, at 24-25.
266 See WORLD BANK, SECOND HIGHWAY REHABILITATION PROJECT HIGHWAY No 1 BETWEEN VINH

AND DONG HA, RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN 1 (Dec. 1996); Nguyen Thi Quy, InvoluntaryResettlement
in Development Projects,4 ASIA PAC. FORUM 2, 14 (1996).
27 See WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL at OD-4.30,14,17 (June 1990).
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responsible authorities. Contrary to Vietnamese law, the Bank recognizes
and compensates the possessory interests of squatters, 268 provided they
269
occupied land prior to the announcement of the road-widening project.
This policy corrects an inconsistency between Decree 90 CP 1994, which
limits compensation to those holding temporary or permanent land use rights,
and Decree 60 CP 1994, which allows all those occupying land in conformity
with relevant Master Plans to legalize their entitlements.
B.

Compensation and the Development Norm

1.

State Legitimization and the Development Norm

In densely settled urban precincts, compulsory acquisition of land is
an inevitable corollary of modernization (hien dai hoa) and
industrialization. 270 This is particularly true in Vietnam, where the public
is expected to make short term personal sacrifices for long term public
development objectives. 271 The subordination of private land interests for
shared economic prosperity is a formula for legal legitimacy successfully
272
adopted by non-communist, developing states elsewhere in East Asia.
Increasingly, the party-state projects nationalist images of a modern
industrial state, a kind of development norm, to justify its monopoly over
instrumental lines of authority. Take for example nonconforming rural
land use. Provided it does not adversely effect production, local officials
can afford to show leniency, especially where coercion may alienate the
party's large rural constituency. Conversely, dissatisfaction with the
levels of compensation paid to those dispossessed by industrial
development projects directly challenges the states' modernization
program and ultimately its claims to legitimacy. The importance attached
to development can be gauged from its ability to displace or at least
268 See WORLD BANK, supra note 266, at 7-12.
269 Compensation equivalent of 60% of valuation

were paid to this class of occupants. See MINISTRY

OF FINANCE, CIRCULAR No. 91/TC/QLCS: PROVIDING GUIDELINES ON THE CLEARANCE COMPENSATION
AND RELOCATION ASSISTANCE FOR SITE CLEARANCE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF NATIONAL ROAD No. 1
(Dec. 6, 1996) (on file with Ministry of Justice Information Center, Hanoi).

270See Do Muoi, VIETNAM: NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES 109-16 (1995) (discussing
Vietnam's path to modernization though industrialization).

271 See Part III. B.4.(d). See generally Cao Duy Ha, Two Basic Issues to Industrialize and Modernize

the Country, TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REV.], July 1994, at 7-10.
272See J. CAMPOS & H. ROOT, THE KEY TO THE ASIAN MIRACLE 28-30 (1996). Although it is still
evoked rhetorically, Marxist-Leninist ideology is losing, but has by no means has lost, its ability to
legitimize state power in Vietnam's emerging market economy. See Vasavakul, supra note 13, at 276-83.
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moderate local imperatives. For example, official sympathy for occupiers
often evaporates where state mandated investment is challenged.273 The
capacity of the development norm to unify the polycentric central and
local land management practices, strongly links the state to local land use
systems. This in turn suggests that non-state legal subsystems exist, if at
all, through the forbearance of the state.
The Dyke Wall Case

2.

If national development was the only or dominate political
consideration, a strong official reaction would have been expected in the
following case. Reacting to public concern that structural cracks in Yen
Phu Nhat Tan dyke may allow the Red River to flood, the Prime Minister
ordered the demolition of housing unlawfully constructed on the dyke
wall. 274 Despite extensive media coverage, of the more than eleven
hundred illegally constructed villas in this affluent West Lake region of
Hanoi, only two hundred were removed and a further one hundred and
fifty partially demolished.275 Allegations of favoritism were ingeniously
dismissed by a government official, "Fortunately no high ranking officials
have houses in the area and there were not many of their relatives there
either. 276 Others were less circumspect, suggesting an unusual degree of
leniency where official and private misbehavior so clearly endangered the
public. 2 77 In contrast to the treatment of lawful occupants facing
compulsory acquisition elsewhere, West Lake violators have not been
fined, most unlawful buildings remain on the dyke wall, and the Hanoi
People's Committee officials targeted for opprobrium -were quickly
reinstated.278 The highly contextualized personalism evinced in this case,
suggests another site of integration between polycentric state authority and
influential members of the public.

273

It is conceded that local enthusiasm for central development initiatives is by no means universal.

However, regional variations are expected in a country prone to localism, and may also reflect the degree
of importance attached to projects at the central level.
274 Decision No. 158-TTg. Judgement of the Prime Minister on Handling Violations of the
Ordinance on Dykes in Hanoi, in Cdng Bdo, 10 VIETNAM L. LEGAL FoRM 15 (May 31, 1995).
275 See Hanoi VNA Dike Protection Law reportedly Violated, Radio Vietnam, Nov
10, 1995,
F.B.I.S. E. ASIA DAILY REP. 95-222, at 76 (Nov 17, 1995).

276AP, See Minister Denies Vietnam Leaders Involved in Dyke Scandal, AFP, Mar. 23, 1995.
277See, Mercy Shown to Squatters, VIETNAM NEWS, Nov. 2, 1995, at 3.
278 See Sacked OfficialsReturning to Posts, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REv., Dec 4, 1995, at 3.
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VI.

COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING LAND MANAGEMENT

A.

JudicialJurisdiction

Disputes concerning buildings and land titles are appearing before
peoples' courts in increasing numbers, dispelling archetypal depictions of
Vietnamese as litigation adverse.279 Where land use right certificates have
not been issued, disputes are resolved by peoples' committees. Courts
consider disputes involving buildings and titles issued by "authorized state
bodies. '280 Reflecting party-state sensitivity, the courts' jurisdiction to
resolve disputes concerning housing rights created before the enactment of
the Ordinance on Residential Housing of 1991 (which was repealed by the
Civil Code) has been temporally suspended.
It seems that property
appropriated by state authorities and the party before housing procedures
were regularized by the Ordinance is now being reclaimed by those holding
28
lawfully issued titles. 1
B.

Land Boundary Disputes

283
2 82
observed by the author,
Judges in land boundary cases
described contests in figurative terms, making little attempt to differentiate
fact and law. Legislation 28 4 that based land use legality on compliance
279

Interview with Nguyen Khac Cong, Supreme People's Court Judge, in Hanoi (Oct. 21, 1997)

[hereinafater NGUYEN KHAC CONG INTERVIEW].
280 Law on Land art. 38 (1993). See Thant Tu, Jurisdiction Over Land Use Right Dispute, 8 NHA
Nuoc VA PHAP LUAT [8 STATE L.] 62, 62-63 (1997); Nguyen Hoal Nam, Mot So Y Kien Ve Nhung Cach
Hieu Khac Nhau Doi Voi Mot Quy Dinh Cu The Trong Luat Dat Dai [Different Opinions on Interpreting
Regulations of the Law on Land] 5 NHA Nuoc VA PHAP LUAT [5 STATE L.] 15-18 (1996).
281 See generally Dinh Van Que, Temporary Suspension ofDealingwith Disputes Over ResidentialHouse
TransactionsEstablishedBefore I July 1991, 10 NHANuoc VAPNAPLUAT [10 STATE L.] 62 (1997).
282 In a country dependant on intensive wet rice agriculture, it is not surprising that land boundary
disputes have a long history. During the collectivization of Northern farm land, ancient boundaries
marking village and family land were removed or relocated to facilitate large scale agrarian production.
The reassertion of former boundaries following de-collectivization has engendered numerous land
disputes. People have not forgotten the old boundaries. The move to de-collectivization was ushered in
by Political Bureau Decision No. 10 Apr. 5, 1988, which introduced household production contracts, a
legitimization of what many villagers were already doing with "sneaky contracts." See generally ADAM
FFORDE,

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN NORTH VIETNAM

1974-1979:

A STUDY

OF COOPERATOR

RESISTANCE TO STATE POLICY 205 (1989).
283 Three cases were observed in the Vinh Phu provincial court and are in the Ha Bing District Court
during February 1994. The author was accompanied by a lecturer from the Faculty of Law, Hanoi
National University and all observations are based on a mediated understanding of trial proceedings.
284 Law of Land, art. 19; Decree on the Enactment of Regulations on the Allocation of Land to
Households and Individuals for Stable and Long Term Use For the Purpose of Agricultural Production,
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with zoning provisions and social need285 was largely ignored. Even
sources of evidence, such as peoples' committee reports were of
peripheral interest. Instead, judges focused on the litigants' war records,
party and community affiliations, and family wealth, and as a
consequence, decisions turned almost entirely on status and
connections. 28 6 Outcomes naturally favored the best-connected litigant,
except where there was a considerable disparity in wealth. In one case,
where litigants both were members of the same xa (commune) party
committee, the court adopted a more professional demeanor, applying an
instrumental legality that sharply differentiated law and fact. In contrast
with earlier cases, the decision-making process here appeared paralyzed
and the court adjourned proceedings pending further in camera
discussions.
Personalities and power relationships dominated the decisionmaking processes. Central ideology expressed in written laws struggled to
control decisions infused with local customs, hierarchies and patronclientism. Replicating the center-local bureaucratic disjunction, this case
study suggests that inferior level judges are actors in a highly fluid,
polycentric state system. Central law has the appearance of generality,
but in practice is frequently treated as a convenient way of getting things
done. Rules and processes are ignored where expediency points in other
directions. At the same time the supervisory powers exercised by the
Supreme Court and party integrate 287
inferior level judges into the central
orbit of the polycentric state system.
No. 64-CP, arts. 6-10,13 (Sept. 27, 1993) (on file with author); Decree on the Regulations on the

Management and the Use of the Administrative Boundary Dossiers Maps and Marker Posts of Various
Levels, No 119-CP, art. 8 (Sept. 16, 1994) (on file with author).
28 Preferential access to land is given to the unemployed children of local cadre, state officials and

retrenched or incapacitated cadre, state officials and military personnel. Decree No. 64 arts. 7, 12
(1994)(on file with author).

286The vernacular press is full of accounts where courts have made serious errors of legal

interpretation or have been influenced by external forces. See, e.g., Tuan Minh, Can Luu Y Giai Quyet
Cac Vu An Tranh Chap Nha Dat- Bien Dong Gia Ca Thuong La Nguyen Nhan Dan Den Tranh Chap
[Notes on House andLand Dispute Resolution: PriceFluctuationBeing the Causefor Dispute], TuoI TRE

[YouTH], May 18, 1996, at 3 (wherein the court annulled a land transfer contract in the mistaken belief
that the vendor had not lawfully gained a right to occupation from that state); Ha Van Thuy, Ca He Thong
Toa An Bi Te Liet Boi Mot To Giay Viet Tay [The Whole Legal System is Paralyzed by a Hand Written
Paper), TUoi TRE [YouTH], Aug. 29, 1996, at 2.
" Decisions made by lower level courts can be appealed. Moreover, the Supreme Court issues circular
letters guiding decision making on important issues. Where courts breach the law, the peoples procuracy have

the jurisdiction to mount criminal prosecutions. This has rarely happened at the local level. See NGuYEN KHAc
CONG INTERViEW, supra note 279; Vu KHAc XUONG INTERVIEW, supra note 157.
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A central theme of much structural analysis of land management
patterns in Southeast Asia is the dichotomy between elites occupying the
center of political and legal authority, and local, self-consciously defined
communities on the periphery.2 8 Usually associated with cities, the ruling
center distinguished itself in order to rise above the local level by borrowing
foreign symbols. 289 For example, centuries after independence from China,

the Confucian bureaucratic elite of eighteenth century Hanoi and nineteenth
century Hue represented the highest level of assimilation of Chinese
practices. 290 During the colonial period a symbiosis of French and
Vietnamese culture, particularly in the administrative centers, culturally
distinguished the bureaucracy from the mass of the people. 291 To a lesser
extent, the DRV's promotion of the essentially European values embedded in
communism generated new forms of cultural disjunction after independence.
The gulf between the normative orientated elite and pragmatic superstitious
masses was further entrenched when large numbers of party 292
and government
cadre received socialist training in Eastern Block universities.
Throughout Vietnam's history, central legal texts have spoken of
normative values which changed according to the relationship between
policy, ideals and the perceived reality of the time.293 By enforcing universal
policies and laws, central lawmakers decided which strand or representation
of a culturally and ethnically diverse society received legitimacy. The
2
The social construction "center-periphery' was largely developed by Edward Shils. See EDWARD
SHILS, CENTER AND PERIPHERY: ESSAYS IN MACROSOCIOLOGY (1975); see also R.B. SMITH & W. WATSON,
INTRODUCTION To EARLY SOUTH EAST ASIA 3-14 (R B. Smith & W. Watson eds., 1979). Others posit a less
bifurcated social structure which "depicts society as a melange of social organizations" or an ongoing dialectic of
resistance, comprised of negotiation and compromise integrating the center and periphery. See respectively
MIDAL, supra note 54, at 28; BENEDIcT J. TRiA KERKvIET, LAND STRucTURES AND LAND REGIMES IN THE
PHILIPPINESAND VIETNAM DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18-23 (1997).
289 Functioning as a supra-local order, the ruling centers assumed Indic, Sinitic, Arabic, or Western
cultural forms. See Richard A. O'Connor, Indigenous Urbanism: Class, City and Society in Southeast
Asia, 26 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 30, 34-36 (1995).
290See generally WOODSIDE, supra note 30.
291 See generally MARR, supra note 61, at 327-65.
292 See generally Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transitionfrom Socialism and

Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 221 (1993). This training
came to an abrupt holt in 1990 when the Soviet Union cut most aid to Vietnam. Id.
293 For example, the Quoc Trieu Hinh Luat (Penal Code of the Le Dynasty) treated infractions of the
state mandated Confucian moral order as criminal violations.
TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39-41 (1988).

See TA VAN TAt, THE VIETNAMESE
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following discussion speculates that the boundaries between state and nonstate legal subsystems are a function of culture.
B.

CulturalSubsystems andLegal Plurality:A Hypothesis

Non-state legal subsystems are likely to coalesce around self contained
communities. This proposition follows from both the mutual obligations
binding Moore's semi-autonomous social fields and the legal theory that
grounds official and unofficial law in formative and sustaining legal
cultures 294 and postulates. 295 Chiba,

96

for example, classifies the socio-legal

entities underlying plural systems of law according to their cultural origin. He
identified two possible sources of law: "indigenous law" and "transplanted
law." Indigenous law is intricately interwoven with local cultures, while
transplanted law is derived from foreign cultures. The close relationship
between law and culture leads to the hypothesis that viable law must
correspond to its culture of origin.297 Or, conversely, legal subsystems are
likely to correspond to cultural subsystems.

Central to this hypothesis is the debate surrounding cultural
relativism. 298 Much has been written about traditional Vietnamese land use
practices which presupposes an authentic, central, national culture (van hoa
dan toc) surrounded by layers of received external influences. 299 This theme

is especially evident in nationalistic tracts designed by the central elite to
294

See Chiba, supra note 135, at 203.

Chiba suggests legal culture is a "cultural configuration in

law." By this he means the patterns of thought and action of a well-defined sociological unit. For his
definition of "cultural configuration," he relies on the work of Ruth Benedict. See R. BENEDICT,
PATTERNs OF CULTURE 42-43, 225-27 (1934).
29' See Chiba, supra note. 15, at 6-7; see also 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MD. L. REv. 1, 27 (1974); see contra Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law
Reform, 92 L. Q. REv. 79, 80-84 (1976) (law is distinct and not dependent on culture).
296See Chiba, supranote 175, at 87-88.
297It is beyond the scope of this article to address the extremely complex question of what is culture.
For the purpose of this discussion culture is taken to mean "the activities and non-physiological products
of human personalities that are not automatically reflex or instinctive." A.L. KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY:
RACE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, PREHISTORY 253 (rev. ed. 1948). Others believe that culture
creates common sets of codes and "[wlith the aid of such a common systems of codes it is possible to
communicate group affiliation to the environment, to the group and to oneself." Jorgan Selmar, "Cultural
Groups" and the Study of Life-Styles and CulturalIdentity, in TRADITION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY 47, 57
(Lauri Honko ed., 1988).
298 See generally C. Geertz, DistinguishedLecture: Anti Anti-Relativism, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 86,
263-78 (1984).
299See, e.g., Minh Quong Dao, supra note 24, at 84-90; Nguyen Tu Chi, The Traditional Viet
Village in Bac Bo: Its OrganizationalStructure andProblems, 61 VIETNAMESE STUD. 7 (1980) (this study
by a Vietnamese historian emphasizes the class structure within villages); Mart, supra note 150, at 46-47.
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highlight a culture in opposition to foreign influences. 300 Like articles of faith,
certain "Vietnamese" institutions like Red River Delta villages are placed
within the traditional core, while other land use patterns, particularly in urban
centers, were relegated to the social margins. For example, socialist planners
"tried to eradicate the inferiority complex in former colonial cities and towns
by introducing into urban life the factors of community life inherent in the
traditional rural community.", 30 1 Pre-colonial notions of land control were
selectively plundered to endow ideologically orthodox land use patterns with
historical legitimacy.30 2 Using similar techniques for entirely different
purposes, various overseas Vietnamese writers have invested pre-colonial
laws with Western natural rights in order to demonstrate that public law
orientated socialist law is an historical aberration. 30 3 Both views insist that it
is not until unauthentic cultural layers are stripped away that the true nature of
Vietnamese land use practices is revealed. Others argue that cultural centers
are ideological constructions and that regional and foreign values and
precepts are integral components of contemporary Vietnamese culture. 3 04
Despite deep regional differences, a common language, education
system, literary canon, habits, myths, artistic forms and politically constructed
history of national salvation 30 5 bind the kinh ethnic majority to a shared
national identity and culture. It is true that the communist party forged a
nation-state out of a regionally diverse people. Nevertheless, their promotion
of political and cultural national unity (doan ket) and national harmony (hoa
hop dan toc) has been particularly successful. So successful, that even
socially marginalized squatters appear to share the same basic legal culture
and postulates as other urban ethnic kinh. This does not mean that
Vietnamese society is homogenous; on the contrary, the nation is a symbiosis
of cultures-not a few being foreign. But it does suggest that in urban centers

300 Dinh-Hoa Nguyen, Vietnamese Creativity in Borrowing Foreign Elements, in BoRRowINGS AND
ADAPTIONS IN VIETNAMESE CULTURE 22 (Truong Buu Lan ed., 1987). (The remainder of the chapter

argues against its opening assertion by listing the large number of borrowed words for Vietnamese
national dishes, like pho (beef noodle soup). Id.at 24.)

301 Nguyen Duc Truyen, From Housing Policies to Urban Development Strategy, 3 Soc.
REV. 82
(1993), availablein Tuong Lai, Urban Governance: A SociologicalApproach, 4 VIETNAM SOC. SCl. 12,
20-21 (1996).
302The Vietnam Law And Legal Forum Journal has run a series of articles since mid-1995 tracing

legal development since Chinese occupation 111 BC-932 AD. Interviews with Nguyen Nhu Phat,
Director Center of Comparative Law, Institute of State and Law, in Hanoi (June 1995; October 1995;
August 1996; December 1996; January 1997).
303See, e.g., TA VAN TAi, THE VIETNAMESE TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 196-201 (1988).
304 See Hoang Ngoc Hien, supra note 60, at 31-33; Taylor, supra note 29, at 22-25.
305 Interview HOANG Noc HIEN INTERVIEW, supra note 31.
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there is insufficient social and cultural separation from the state legal system
to justify the existence of non-state legal subsystems. As the previously
discussed hypothesis implies, legal pluralism is only likely to exist where selfcontained and culturally distinct communities reside within the geo-political
borders of another culture.
C.

Cultural Difference: The Case ofEthnic Minorities

To test this hypothesis, this discussion evaluates the legal autonomy of
hill tribe communities. Ethnically, linguistically and culturally different,
swidden (slash and bum agriculture) communities are far removed from kinh
social structures, beliefs, habits, and more importantly their laws.3 °6 A
combination of remoteness and economic backwardness have partially
quarantined some hill tribes from low land kinh influence 30 7 Though it is
difficult to generalize about the diverse highland minorities, they have never
been completely isolated from themselves- or the low land ethnic kinh.3 °8
Currently only three percent of villages are monocultural, while the majority
have three or more ethmic groups. It is only in rural xom (hamlets) that ethnic
and cultural homogeneity is common. 30 9 Recent legal-anthropological work
suggests that social structures in the more remote xom contain most of the
elements of non-state legal subsystems, 310 including self-referential land rules,
conformity with habits and rituals, dispute resolution mechanisms, sanctions
for non-compliance, and societal processes that have the capacity to
accommodate new events and change power structures.
Since these
communities are culturally, economically and socially self-contained, the
extensive legal, administrative and relational interconnections that bind kinh
sub-groups with the state legal subsystem are comparatively unimportant.
Despite permeable boundaries, a case can be made that remote hill tribes
" Swiddening has historically been relatively unaffected by outside rules See Vo Quy, Ethnic
Minorities in Vietnam: Culture, Environment and Development, 2 SOC. Sci. 84, 84-88 (1995).
307 There are approximately 60 ethnic groups, each with their own path-dependent histories. For
example, Vietnamese Imperial rulers influenced the Muong from early times. See To Dong Hai,

Conventions and Practices of "Muong" Ethnic Minority, 3 VIETNAM L. & LEG. FORUM, 26, 28 (Sept.

1996); while the Dao group are tightly self-regulated with strong internal sanctions for non-compliance

with community norms. See To- Dong Hai, The "Dao"Ethnic Minority: Its Customs and Practices, 3
VIETNAM L. & LEGAL FORUM, 28, 28-29 (Nov. 1996).
301See DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN VIETNAM's NORTHERN MOUNTAIN REGION 10 (Deanna
Donovan et
al.eds., 1997).
'09 Id.

at 9.

310See, e.g., To Dong Hai, The GiaRai and Its Customary Laws, 4 VIETNAM L. & LEGAL FORUM
27,
27-28 (1997); To Dong Hai, The Kho Ethnic Minority and Its Customary Law, 3 VIETNAM L. & LEGAL
FORUM 26, 28-29 (1997).
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function in non-state legal subsystems This conclusion supports the
hypothesis that legal pluralism is a function of cultural segregation. It is no
coincidence that much of the literature concerning legal pluralism maps the
boundaries of non-state legal subsystems along cultural and/or ethnic lines.311
Minority assertion of customary rights conflict with efforts to transplant
support lowland
the market-orientated national land laws needed to 312
State laws3 13
immigration and agricultural investment in the highlands.
designed to promote sedentary agriculture (van dong dinh canh dinh cu)

strike at the heart of minority cultural practices and communal relationships
grounded in a swidden agricultural economy.3 14 The imposition of land title
systems on customary, communal forms of tenure has elsewhere reduced
legal certainty, exciting disputation and ultimately the erosion of customary
values and authority. 315 This sharp clash of cultural, economic, and political

values evinces clear boundaries between the state and non-state legal
subsystems.

Faced with declining productivity in traditional swidden agriculture,
there is now an urgent need for new agricultural methods requiring cultural,

technological, and legal change.316 Since ethnic minorities have little
experience with instrumental rule, the government is using moral education to
convey the principles of state land policy and in the process inculcating kinh

culture.317 As the poorest in a poor nation, it is unlikely that swidden farmers
311 See, e.g., S.E. Merry, Anthropology, Law, and Transitional Processes, 21 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992); Anan Ganjanapan, The Northern Thai Tenure System: Local Customs versus
National Laws, 28 L. SoC. REV. 609 (1994); June Prill-Brett, Indigenous Land Rights and Legal
Pluralism among Philippine Highlanders,28 L. Soc. REv. 687; Sally Engle Merry, PopularJustice and
the Ideology of Social Transformation, 1 Soc. LEGAL STUD. 161 (1992).
312 See Tran Quang Nhiep, Effecting New Change in the Areas Inhabited by Ethnic Minorities,TAP
CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REV.], June 1994, reprintedin F.B.I.S. E. ASIA DAILY REP. 94-187 at 86, 87
(Sept. 27, 1994).
313 See, e.g., Decision No. 73 Tg Approving the Master Plan for Protection of Forests in the
Upstream Area of the Lower Ayun Irrigation Project (GIA LAI PROVINCE) art. 1 (Feb. 4, 1995) (on file with
author); Decree on Sanctions Against Administrative Violations in the Domain of Land Management and
Use, No. 4-CP, arts. 1(3), 3(1), 3(2) (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
314See DEVELOPMENT TRENDs INVIETNAM's NORTHERN MOUNTAIN REGION, supranote 308, at 16, 18.
311See, e.g., R.A. Cramb & I.R. Willis, The Role of Traditional Institutions in Rural
Development: Community-Based Land Tenure and Government Land Policy in Sarawak, Malaysia,
18 WORLD DEV. 347 (1990).
316 See DEVELOPMENTTRENDSIN VIETNAM'SNORTHERNMOUNTIANREGION, supranote 308, at 133-34.
317 See Vo Oanh, Step Up the Mass Movement to Implement the Party Resolution on
Industrializationand Modernization ofAgriculture and Rural Economy at the District Level, QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN, Aug. 24. 1994, translated in F.B.I.S. E. ASIA DAILY REP. 94-182 at 91,92. The Legal
Research Institute attached to the Ministry of Ministry of Justice translated segments of the Law on Land
1993 and Law on Forest Protection and Development into local dialects, using poetry and song. Interview
with Hoan Lien, Vice Director Legal Research Institute, in Hanoi (June 20, 1994).
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possess sufficient resources to survive the transition to intensive agriculture
unaided by the state. Their dilemma calls into question the practical
usefulness of legal pluralism as a system of analysis in circumstances where
the social structures that convey access to central power and resources lie
outside the legal orbit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is easy to portray Vietnam's bifurcated urban landscape as a
series of interlocking, quasi-autonomous legal subsystems. This approach
is particularly appealing where land contests concern those in need of
protection from the central state, like squatters and ethnic minorities
Reality is, however, more complex then structural theory.
groups.
Bifurcated land controls benefit the government, which cannot provide
alternative housing for the urban poor, just as much as they benefit the
large number of urban residents who enjoy access to inexpensive
unregistered land.
The overriding primacy given by all levels of
government to modernization and industrialization ensures that the elite
can upgrade their cities and that foreign investors have access to
compulsorily acquired land. The treatment of authorized and unauthorized
land control as two components of the state legal system, is increasingly
unraveling as urban investment excites numerous contests between
competing social interests. As official law loses social validity where the
state openly tolerates contradicting unofficial law. The dilemma facing
most occupiers is that by staying outside the official system they remain
vulnerable to development, 318 but registration is time consuming, costly,
and exposes owners to a range of building controls and taxes.
Legal pluralism's explanation for urban land control is riddled with
disjunctions.
Its narrow form juxtaposes central uniformity and the
pluralist vision of coexisting systems of law. 319 Paradoxically, this is
achieved by applying norms embedded in the central culture to measure
social difference in other groups and systems of law. Not surprisingly,
wherever it has been tried,32 ° central state legality has subordinated non11 Even if occupiers legalize their land holding, until the compulsory acquisition laws are changed to
guarantee compensation based on market value, a legal title does not ensure financially secure property rights.
319 It should be noted that in a limited fashion courts are permitted to take into account local custom,
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state legal subsystems. By challenging the hegemony of central legal
authority, broad legal pluralism appears to avoid this problem. For a
society like Vietnam that inherited colonial boundaries, it offers a means
of symbolically recognizing ethnic minorities as formally equal, and at the
same time embedded in their own historical, geographic, cultural and
historic context.
The architecture of stacked layers of law proposed by broad legal
pluralism poorly represents the polycentric distribution of urban land
control in Vietnam. Adapted from principles developed by the Western
civil rights movement, 32 1 legal pluralism transfigures political, economic,
and cultural rights into legal rights. This strategy is reasonably effective in
protecting the dispossessed and ethnic minorities in societies regulated by
the rule of law, but is of doubtful value in countries like Vietnam where
law is little more then an instrumental means of implementing state policy.
As the case studies establish, Vietnamese bureaucrats are not afraid to
bend laws to serve or disadvantage those on the legal periphery.
When transplanted to East Asia, legal pluralism has the potential to
hijack indigenous political, economic and cultural values by reinventing
them as civil rights. 322 In a society like Vietnam, where law is clearly
filtered through powerful social and political relationships, a problem
exists in identifying legal rules as the most important structural
characteristic. By forcing diverse and interwoven familial and patronclient networks into "stacked" subsystems, legal pluralism de-emphasizes
the personal linkages that blur distinctions between state and society.
Legal classifications based on subsystems also fail to adequately account
for the integrative, structuring forces generated when administrative
discretion blends official and unofficial law. The problem cannot simply
be resolved by re-emphasizing the porosity of subsystem boundaries. If
subsystem boundaries are sufficiently porous to account for these
integrative forces, then the entire notion of bounded non-state legal
subsystems begins to unravel.
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Provided political objections to the recognition of ancien regime
and possessory interests can be overcome, a rational, facilitative model of
land registration could expedite the legalization of land tenure. Indeed,
some commentators believe that the history of land tenure is so complex
and politically sensitive that authorities should disregard past land policy
and extend legal recognition to all those occupying land at a certain
date.323 Land regularization programs elsewhere suggest that facilitative
registration systems that reward compliance with access to finance and
reduced taxation and penalize non-compliance, reduce spontaneous
housing and unregistered land transactions.3 24
For example, the
regularization of adverse possession in areas zoned residential is a policy
currently used by the state as an incentive to build houses on suitable state
land, rather than along waterways and road verges. Experimentation in Ho
Chi Minh City with "one stop" land registration procedures has also
demonstrated that overcoming legal and institutional shortcomings is
another necessary step in the regularization of urban land.325 However,
without state financial assistance or access to bank finance, unregistered
occupiers are unlikely to raise their building standards and complete the
expensive and time-consuming procedures necessary for articulation into
the official legal system. Above all else, to the extent that unofficial
occupancy is created by the state, it must also be resolved by the state.
For example, legal rights granted by state authorities are meaningless until
the state provides access to inexpensive urban land.
For ethnic minorities, integration into the central legal system will
undoubtedly subordinate culturally based legal practices. Paradoxically,
state recognition of traditional communal mechanisms would increase land
security at a fraction of the cost of establishing individual legal titles. For
the majority kinh, the problem is gaining access to the political processes
that control land planning and building regulations. Though modest in
scale, state experiments with resident appointed management committees
have evidently produced dramatic improvements in the maintenance of

323 This view is supported by the Hanoi Chief Architects Office. HA VAN QUE INTERVIEW, supranote 242.
324 See Rodolfo Mercado & Richardo Uzin, Regularization of Spontaneous Settlements, 8:2

BUILDING ISSUES 15 (1996). Various rational land regularization procedures have been developed
with some success in squatter settlements in South America. Id.
325See Mai Quoc Binh, Overview of the Implementation of Public Administration Reform in Ho Chi
Minh City, Paper Presented at the UNDP International Colloquium on Public Administration Reform
(Sept. 24-26, 1996).
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state owned housing.326
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On a broader level, community participation in

local planing decisions is seen by some policy makers as a means of
familiarizing the public with land laws, and at the same time instilling a
sense of ownership of local land management. However, after decades of
central planning laws are generally perceived as mechanisms used by
remote governments to impose top down controls without consulting the
wishes of the people.32 7 As a consequence, the public does not identify
with or accept responsibility for laws. The Vietnamese do not usually
think in terms of "asserting civic power against the state ...

they prefer to

infiltrate the state." 328 The particularistic routes and means used to
achieve personal objectives are a function of political, economic and
social factors and as such are only indirectly addressed by systems of legal
analysis. By emphasizing legal difference, legal pluralism distracts
attention away from these non-legal channels that effectively broker
genuine changes to urban land management.

326 See

Bang Thanlh, United Units Point Way Aheadfor Urban Living, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.,

Oct. 27, 1997, at 21.

327Experimentation is already underway in Hanoi with devolution of city level planning powers to
the district and phuong level peoples' committees. HA VAN QUE INTERVIEW, supra note 242.
328David Marr, The Vietnam Communist Party and Civil Society, Paper Presented at the Vietnam
Update Conference (Nov. 10-11 1994).

